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Attorney-funded mass medical screenings for asbestos and silica litigation have been 
shown to have a high rate of false positive diagnoses. It is likely that hundreds of thousands of 
asbestos and silica lawsuits have been based on unreliable medical evidence. Several analysts 
have discussed the financial and legal consequences for defendants and the courts. This paper 
adds to the discussion by focusing on the effects on the workers who are screened. I find that 
there are numerous breaches in acceptable medical procedures. Harms to workers include: 
unnecessary anxiety caused by false positive diagnoses, unwarranted x-ray exposures that 
increase the risk of cancer, and invasive procedures that may have resulted from false positive 
diagnoses. 
 
The most effective prevention of further abuses by attorney-funded litigation screenings 
would target the point at which the lawsuits are allowed to move forward in the courts.  I 
recommend that judges carefully scrutinize asbestos and silica claims and dismiss any that are 
not based on reliable medical evidence; legislatures should establish medical standards for these 
suits; and medical authorities should investigate attorney-funded screening activities. 
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Regulating Attorney-Funded Mass Medical Screenings:  
A Public Health Imperative? 
 
Judyth Pendell 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Asbestos litigation has been in the courts for decades, yet most of the costs lie in 
the future. Although $74 billion had been spent on the litigation through 2002 RAND 
predicts an additional $130 to $195 billion will be spent going forward.
1 This growth and 
its timing were not predicted – a 1983 RAND report projected total costs of less than $40 
billion.
2   
Similarly, silica litigation is experiencing dramatic and unexpected increases. 
Only 342 silica claims were filed in Mississippi over the three-year time period of 1999-
2001. 
3 Approximately 20,000 silica claims were filed in that state from 2002-2004.  
The litigation growth in both asbestos and silica is not supported by medical or 
epidemiologic evidence showing comparable increases in asbestosis and silicosis. Federal 
government data show that silicosis deaths are declining. 
4 Although the same data source 
shows small increases in asbestosis deaths, asbestosis is generally not fatal
5, and other 
sources conclude that the incidence of asbestosis should have been declining around the 
mid 1990s.
6        
                                                 
1  Stephen Carroll et al., Asbestos Litigation (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, May 2005). 
2  James Kakalik et.al., Costs of Asbestos Litigation (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, 1983). 
3  See David M. Setter and Andrew L. Kalish, Recent Screening Developments: The MDL Silica 1553 
Daubert Hearing, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: SILICA (2005). 
4 See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH,; THE WORK-RELATED 
LUNG DISEASE SURVEILLANCE REPORT, 2002 54 tbl 3-1 )Pub. No. 2003-111, 2003); DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L INST. 
FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, WORKER HEALTH CHARTBOOK, 2000; FATAL 
ILLNESS 3 (Pub. No. 2003-111, 2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/00-127pd.html (last visited 
Apr. 29, 2005.)  
5 See Carroll et al. supra note 2 at 137 (stating that “Data on asbestosis cases or deaths are limited and 
unreliable because asbestosis generally is not fatal.” The report also cites an unpublished 1884 study 
prepared for the Congressional Research Service predicting that 2,774 excess deaths due to asbestosis 
would occur in 1982, decreasing to 734 in 2007.)    
6 See Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class’s Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect Between 
Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33 (2003) 36. (“It has been almost thirty years since large 
numbers of industrial plant and constsruction workers have been exposed to high levels of friable asbestos 
fibers in the courts of their employment. Based on the latency periods associated with asbestos related  
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Recent developments link these sharp increases in claiming for both asbestos and 
silica disease to attorney-funded mass screening operations. Several small medical 
screening companies are providing testing services to plaintiff attorneys who use mass 
marketing techniques to attract workers to testing sites.  
Audits of asbestos and silica claims reveal that large numbers of claims are based 
on unreliable medical evidence. An American Bar Association Commission formed to 
craft a legal standard for asbestos-related impairment reported that the rate of “positive” 
findings, those consistent with prior asbestos exposure, generated by litigation screening 
companies often exceeds 50% and sometimes reaches 90%.
7 Since 1986, however, there 
have been at least four impartial panels of scientists who have evaluated the accuracy of 
litigation-related asbestos diagnoses, and they have found the rate of false positives from 
the screening companies to range from 66% to 97%.
8 
The consequences of having so many inaccurate diagnoses serve as the bases for 
lawsuits are both financial and human. The financial costs to defendant companies have 
been substantial. RAND estimates that 73 companies have declared bankruptcy as a 
result of asbestos litigation.
9 At least two companies have been driven into bankruptcy, in 
part, by silica litigation.
10 The hidden victims of asbestos and silica litigation are the 
employees of the bankrupt companies.    
The human costs imposed on the workers who have been the objects of these 
screenings have been largely overlooked. It has been estimated that over 750,000 workers 
have been screened by attorney-funded mass screening companies.
11 Assuming this is 
                                                                                                                                                 
disease, rates of disease manifestation and claims based on such manifestations should have begun to 
significantly decline by no later then the mid 90s.”)  
7  See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ASBESTOS LITIG., ABA REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES, RECOMMENDATION & RESOLUTION, 12 (2003).  
8 See R.B. Reger et. al. Cases of Alleged Asbestos-Related Disease: A Radiologic Re-Evaluation, 32:11 J. 
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1088 (1990); Hon. Carl Rubin & Laura Ringenbach, The Use of Court Experts, 
137 F.R.D. 35 (1991); A.R.. LOCLIO ET AL., BIOSTATISTICS SECTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH 
EVALUATION SCIENCES, PA. STATE UNIV. COLLEGE OF MEDICINE & CEN TER FOR 
CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY AND BIOSTATISTICS, THE MANVILLE PERSONAL INJURY 
SETTLEMENT TRUST X-RAY AUDIT: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE 
UNDERLYING DISEASE PROCESS FOR MEDICAL REVIEW BY CERTIFIED B-READERS (1998); 
Joseph N. Gitlin et al., Comparison of “B” Readers’ Interpretations of Chest Radiographs for Asbestos 
Related Changes, 11 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 843 (2004). 
9 See Carroll supra note 2 at xxvii.  
10 Clemtex (2003) and Swan Transportation (2003). 
11 See Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33. HOFLR. 833. (2005) at 836.    
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accurate, somewhere between 250,000 and 650,000
12 workers have been told they have 
asbestos-related disease when in all probability they do not. Further, these workers have 
been deprived of many of the protections that accompany appropriate medical testing and 
as a result may have been harmed.  
This paper will: 1) provide background on asbestos and silica litigation and on the 
significance of attorney-funded mass screenings in the litigation; 2) describe the 
operations and management of attorney-funded mass screenings; 3) discuss the financial 
impact of asbestos litigation on workers of now-bankrupt defendants’ ; 4) raise concerns 
relative to the effect these screenings may be having on the workers who have been and 
are being screened; and 5) offer policy options and make recommendations. 
 
2. Background on Asbestos and Silica Litigation and the Role of Attorney-Funded  
    Mass Screenings 
Asbestos diseases are dose-related diseases: the higher the level of exposure, the 
more likely and more severe the disease. Even mesothelioma, a lethal type of cancer 
alleged to occur in the absence of intensive or longstanding exposure to asbestos, 
generally requires more than minimal exposure. Most of the people who filed claims in 
the first few decades of the asbestos litigation worked in environments where large 
amounts of asbestos fibers were airborne. Since the mid-1980s, plaintiffs have had less 
and less exposure, and the severity of their diseases has lessened correspondingly. Now, 
ninety percent of current claimants have non-cancerous claims and the majority of them 
are unimpaired.
13 To maintain their claims, these claimants often just produce a doctor’s 
statement that their x-rays are “consistent with” asbestos-related disease, a standard that 
is at odds with medical diagnostic protocols and subverts traditional legal standards of 
proof.
14 To satisfy this requirement, claimants often provide reports generated by doctors 
                                                 
12 This range is the product of multiplying 750,000 by the percentage of positive diagnoses as estimated by 
the ABA, then by the percentage of false positive diagnoses estimated by the audits discussed in this paper.  
13  See Stephen Carroll et al., Asbestos Litigation Costs and Compensation xv (RAND Inst. for Civil 
Justice, 2005); Jennifer Biggs et al., Overview of Asbestos Issues and Trends 3 (Dec. 2001), available at 
http://www.actuary.org/mono.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2005); see also Roger Parloff, Asbestos, FORTUNE, 
Sept. 6, 2004, at 186 (“According to estimates accepted by the most experienced federal judges in this area, 
two-thirds to ninety percent of the nonmalignants are ‘unimpaireds’”). 
14  See Brickman, supra n.8, at 61 (stating that the “consistent with” standard “is not simply tolerant of 
specious claiming but an active inducement thereto.”).    
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hired by their law firms or screening companies, not by their own treating physicians. 
These reports are based on x-rays and sometimes on pulmonary function tests (PFTs) 
generated at mass medical screenings sponsored by lawyers.
15 
Attorney-sponsored medical screenings began in the early 1980s. They evolved 
from programs that tested injured union workers who worked with asbestos, to the for-
profit entities that actively recruit anyone who might have been exposed to asbestos. The 
tactics of mass tort litigation encouraged their use.
16 In order to handle asbestos cases 
efficiently, courts weakened legal standards for recovery on asbestos claims. For 
example, courts dispensed with evidentiary requirements and the need for proof of a 
causal relationship between a specific company’s product and a specific individual’s 
asbestos-related disease. In other words, minimal exposure to a defendant’s product, 
however tenuous, was generally sufficient in most states to get the case to a jury. They 
also allowed thousands of dissimilar claims to be aggregated in a single lawsuit.
17 When 
individual claims are consolidated, defendants face great pressure to settle all the claims, 
because it lowers overall costs to the company to settle the cases en masse than to litigate 
the merits of each individual claim.
18 Hence, attorney-sponsored mass medical screenings 
became a primary tool for the recruitment of new claimants, particularly clients with little 
or no impairment. As the judge presiding over the federal asbestos multidistrict litigation 
has explained: “Only a very small percentage of the cases filed have serious asbestos-
related afflictions,” but they “are prone to be lost in the shuffle with pleural and other 
non-malignant cases.”
19    
                                                 
15  In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 237 F. Supp. 2d 297, 309 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(asbestos claimants “are diagnosed largely through plaintiff-lawyer arranged mass screenings programs 
targeting possible exposed asbestos-workers and attraction of potential claimants through the mass 
media.”); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Am. Employers' Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1053, 1057 (D. Mass. 1989) 
(“[M]any of these cases result from mass X-ray screenings at occupational locations conducted by unions 
and/or plaintiffs' attorneys, and many claimants are functionally asymptomatic when suit is filed.”). 
16  See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Addressing the “Elephantine Mass” of Asbestos Cases: Consolidation 
Versus Unimpaired Dockets (Pleural Registries) and Case Management Plans that Defer Claims Filed By 
the Non-Sick, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 271 (2004). 
17  See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, A Letter to the Trial Judges of America: How The Focus 
on Efficiency is Hurting You and Innocent Victims in Asbestos Litigation, 24 AM. J. OF TRIAL ADVOC. 247 
(2000).  
18  See Victor E. Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Law of Unintended Consequences in Asbestos 
Litigation: How Efforts to Streamline The Litigation Have Fueled More Claims, 71 MISS. L.J. 531 (2001).  
19  In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 1996 WL 539589, *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 1996); see also 
Brickman, supra n.8, at 54-62 (discussing the development and use of mass medical screenings in asbestos 
litigation and settlement procedures).   
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With as many as 73 companies in bankruptcy protection as a result of asbestos 
litigation, the amounts plaintiffs are able to recover against these companies is limited. 
One of the responses of some asbestos plaintiff attorneys has been to take the model for 
developing a client base of asbestos claims and adapt it to another pulmonary 
occupational disease: silicosis. As a result, silica litigation, which had been stable for 
many years, with a relatively low number of cases filed annually, suddenly experienced a 
dramatic increase in filings in 2002.
20 
This increase in case filings has occurred despite federal government data 
showing that silica-related deaths are decreasing. According to the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the annual number of silica-related deaths has 
dropped nearly eighty-four percent, from 1,157 in 1968, to 187 in 1999.
21 The CDC 
reported a 70 percent decline in silicosis mortality comparing 1968-1981 to 1982-2000. 
22   
If over 750,000 workers have undergone attorney-sponsored asbestos and silica 
screenings during the past two decades,
23 it does not take a very high error rate in 
diagnoses to generate a substantial number of claims that should not be in the system. 
There is considerable evidence that the error rate is, in fact, quite high.   
An American Bar Association Commission formed to create a legal standard for 
asbestos-related impairment
24 reported that the rate of positive findings (i.e. findings 
consistent with prior asbestos exposure) generated by litigation screening companies is 
“startlingly high,” often exceeding 50% and sometimes reaching 90%.
25 Several major 
audits of the diagnostic accuracy of asbestos and silica claims have provided 
independent, compelling evidence of a high rate of false positives.    
 
                                                 
20 See Roy T. Atwood et al., Commentary, In Silica Litigation, The Numbers Alone Dictate Careful 
Scrutiny of Injury and Causation, 26:2 ANDREWS ASBESTOS LITIG. RPTR. 12 (Dec. 4, 2003); see also 
Asbestos: The Mixed Dust and FELA Issues: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109
th 
Cong., at 9 (Feb. 2, 2005) (statement of Lester Brickman, Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 
of Yeshiva University); Susan Warren, Silicosis Suits Rise Like Dust: Lawyers in Asbestos Cases Target 
Many of the Same Companies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2003, at B5; Gilbert S. Keteltas, Learning the Lessons 
of Asbestos: Courts and Defendants Can Do Better in The Case of Silica, 26:6 ANDREWS ASBESTOS LITIG. 
RPTR. 9 (Jan. 15, 2004). 
21  See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES Supra Note 6. 
22  Id. 
23  See supra note 11. 
24 The ABA Commission proposed the enactment of federal medical criteria standards for nonmalignant 
asbestos claims. The ABA’s House of Delegates adopted the Commission’s proposal in February 2003. 
25 See Am. Bar Ass’n Report, supra note 7 at 8.  
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The National Tire Workers Litigation Project 
The first major discovery of  inaccurate x-ray readings involved a project in 
which two attorneys and three physicians formed the National Tire Workers Litigation 
Project (NTWLP) in 1986 to sign up tire workers and to file claims for lung injury from 
asbestos. According to a handout distributed to tire workers, 64 percent of the workers 
first examined by chest radiography for asbestosis were positive and in a second group 95 
percent had the disease. Scientists subsequently conducted a radiologic re-evaluation of 
439 tire workers’ claims previously designated by the NTWLP as having x-ray changes 
consistent with asbestos exposure.
26 The re-evaluation was conducted by a panel of three 
board-certified radiologists who were NIOSH certified B-readers. The readings were 
performed independently, according to the International Labour Office Guidelines for 
Pneumoconioses Classification. Of the 439 films re-interpreted by the three independent 
radiologists the percentage of positive films was 3.7%, 3.0% and 2.7%. A consensus 
evaluation indicated that approximately 3.6% of the subjects evaluated had a condition 
consistent with asbestos exposure — a figure that markedly differs from the 64% and 
95% findings of the NTWLP. 
 
Review of cases by Judge Carl Rubin 
A review undertaken by a federal court overseeing asbestos cases found similar 
problems. Of the sixty-five asbestos claims studied by court-appointed medical experts, 
almost two-thirds had no asbestos-related conditions at all.
27  
 
The Manville Audit 
In 1982, Johns Manville, a principal defendant in asbestos litigation, declared 
bankruptcy, and a trust fund was established thereafter to provide compensation to 
Manville claimants. By 1994, asbestosis claims exceeded anticipated filing rates by 94 
percent, and by the end of 1995 by almost 250 percent. Patricia Houser, President of the 
Claims Resolution Management Company, which provides claims resolution services to 
the Trust, offered the following testimony in an affidavit to the court in 1999: 
                                                 
26 See R.G. Reger et al.supra note 8.  
27 See Hon. Carl Rubin & Laura Ringenbach, supa note 8.  See also supra text p 43.  
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Asbestos claims were failing medical audit at high rates. In 
contrast, increases in asbestos-related cancer and pleural disease 
filings, which did not have a troubling failure rate in medical 
audit, had far less alarming rates of variance from predicted 
levels. We thus had reason to believe, on a statistical basis alone, 
that a portion of the asbestosis claims might not be based on 
reliable medical evidence. At the same time, we also observed that 
the nature of the claims being submitted had fundamentally 
shifted—it became widely known that the vast majority of new 
claims were being submitted through mass litigation screenings. 
 
These developments caused the Trust to implement a medical audit program in 
which neutral experts analyzed and evaluated five percent of the claims submitted by 
each law firm during each payment cycle. The process was designed to be biased in favor 
of  confirming the diagnosis presented by claimants, giving them the benefit of the doubt. 
Still, the audit showed there was a very high medical audit failure rate. For example, 
analysis of the 1996 submission showed that about 41 percent of claimants either had no 
disease at all or had a less severe condition than they alleged.
28 Moreover, the ten 
physicians used most often by plaintiffs’ law firms had an average failure rate of 63 
percent.
29 Based on these numbers, one researcher calculated that the Trust alone might 
have paid $190 million for inauthentic or inflated claims between 1995 and 2001.
30 When 
all asbestos claims during that time period are considered, the value of the inauthentic 
and inflated claims approaches $28.5 billion.
31 
 
The Gitlin Study 
Similar discrepancies were recently reported in a 2004 study by researchers at 
Johns Hopkins University who re-evaluated 551 films interpreted by B-readers and 491 
                                                 
28 See A.R. LOCALIO et al., supra note 8. 
29 See Roger Parloff, Mass Tort Medicine Men, AM. LAW., Jan. 3, 2003, at 98.  
30 See id. 
31 See id.at 98.   
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matching interpretative reports used as a basis for asbestos claims.
32 In the initial 
readings, 91.7% of the 551 films were interpreted as positive for abnormalities. The films 
were re-interpreted by six B-readers in an independent manner with a finding of only 
4.5% having those same abnormalities. The data showed statistically significant 
differences between the interpretations of the initial B-readers – that were used as a basis 
for the lawsuit -- and the independent B-reader panel. Members of the radiologic 
community subsequently called for further investigation into questionable B-reader 
practices.
33  
 
The Silica MDL 
Federal District Court Judge Janis Graham Jack, who is presiding over the federal 
multidistrict silica litigation in Texas, took an unusual position in response to a discovery 
request from defendants last year. She allowed the defendants to depose the screening 
doctors who diagnosed the plaintiffs, even though it was not necessarily the plaintiff 
lawyers’ plan to use them as witnesses in trial. The defense lawyers used this as an 
opportunity to compare asbestos claimants with silicosis claimants, using social security 
numbers. Looking at one particular screening company, they found 3,691 plaintiffs had 
been told, prior to December 31, 2000, that their x-rays showed shadows consistent with 
asbestosis but not silicosis. Yet when those plaintiffs were examined again after 
December 31, 2000, 3715 had x-rays supposedly showing silicosis related shadows as 
well. For those workers examined for the first time after December 31,2000, screening 
doctors regularly saw both types of shadows: asbestosis and silicosis. One doctor issued 
331 separate asbestosis and silicosis diagnoses based on one reading of each worker’s x-
ray, with neither report referring to the other. 
34    
                                                 
32 See Joseph N. Gitlin et al. supra note 8.  
33 See Murray L. Janower & Leonard Berlin, Editorial, “B” Readers’ Radiographic Interpretations in 
Asbestos Litigation: Is Something Rotten in the Courtroom? 11 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 842 (2004) (stating 
that “the radiological community itself clearly has an obligation to conduct further investigations to 
determine whether the integrity of the B-reader radiologists has indeed been breached and if so, to repair 
the breach, implement measures to prevent it from happening again, and restore integrity to our noble and 
proud profession.”)   
34 See Roger Parloff, Diagnosing for Dollars, Fortune, June 13, 2005.  
 
9
During court hearings on the reliability of the medical evidence supporting the 
plaintiffs’ silicosis claims Judge Jack said that she saw “great red flags of fraud” in the 
way these screenings were used to recruit thousands of plaintiffs to file their lawsuits.
35  
In May 2005, a federal grand jury was convened in Manhattan to consider 
possible criminal charges arising out of the silica related claims that emerged in federal 
court proceedings in Corpus Christi, Texas.” According to The New York Times, 
“Evidence was entered in the Texas court that some doctors had little training in how to 
interpret X-rays to find signs of silica-related illness and that they reached their 
conclusions after spending just minutes looking at an X-ray – or worse, just a prepared 
report based on an X-ray. Some doctors backed away from their conclusions; one cut 
short his own testimony to ask for a lawyer.”
36 According to the Times the grand jury has 
subpoenaed documents from at least one of the companies involved in the case before 
Judge Jack. Further, last month Judge Jack revealed that on June 30, 2005 her court had 
received a communication from an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of Texas, on behalf of the U.S. Attorneys Office in the Southern District of New 
York, requesting access to items in the MDL document depository/x-ray repository for 
use in grand jury proceedings in New York. 
37    
 
 
 
                                                 
35 See Transcript, Daubert Hearings Before the Honorable Janis Graham Jack, U.S. District Court Judge, In 
re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1553, 23 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2005); see also Jonathan D. Glater, 
Companies Get Weapon in Injury Suits; Many Silica-Damaged Plaintiffs Also Filed Claims Over Asbestos, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 1415209; Jerry Mitchell, Silicosis Screening Process 
Irks Judge, CLARION-LEDGER, Mar. 6, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 3546204 (explaining that 
U.S. District Judge Janis Graham Jack used the word “fraudulent” to describe the process that led to the 
diagnosis of many of the MDL plaintiffs); Mary Alice Robbins, Judge in Silicosis Suits Critical of 
Plaintiffs Counsel, 21:3 TEX.LAW. 1 (Mar. 21,2005); Asbestos personal injury lawyer Steve Kazan of 
Oakland, California, has said “[t]he whole thing is somewhere between shameless and shameful.” Justin 
Scheck, Critics Sandblast Local Silicosis Suits, THE RECORDER, Apr. 1, 2005 at 7.  
36 Jonathan D. Glater, Civil Suits Over Silica in Texas Become a Criminal Matter in New York, NY TIMES, 
May 18, 2005, B1. 
37  In re Silica Prods. Liab. Lit., MDL 1553, Admin. Order No. 31 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2005). (Judge Jack 
further reported that on August 1, 2005 Attorney Scott Hooper had removed in excess of 1,000 x-rays from 
the repository , despite the fact that she had previously denied Hooper’s request to take the x-rays, and 
despite the fact that she had informed counsel to the litigation that the documents and x-rays were under 
federal scrutiny. At the time the x-rays were removed, Hooper signed a document indicating he was 
removing 1,342 x-rays. As of 5:00 p.m. August 22, 2005 he had returned only 1,219. Her reaction: “In the 
future the Court would like Mr. Hooper to form a closer relationship with the law.”).      
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3. The Operations and Management of Attorney-Funded Mass Screenings 
Within the field of preventive medicine there are standards that determine when 
and under what circumstances medical screenings of asymptomatic patients are 
appropriate, including the relative risks and benefits to the individuals from the 
screenings, which may be intrusive, painful or potentially harmful.
38 Whether health-
related medical screenings are performed individually or on a broad scale, they should be 
conducted by qualified medical personnel and follow medically accepted protocols.
39 
Attorney-sponsored screenings, on the other hand, are driven by plaintiffs’ lawyers’ 
efforts to generate a substantial number of asbestos and silica claims to facilitate mass 
settlements. As former U.S. Attorney Griffin Bell stated: “These screenings often do not 
comply with federal or state health and safety law. There often is no medical purpose for 
these screenings and claimants receive no medical follow-up.”
40 
This section contains a description of mass screening practices that deviate from 
accepted medical procedures based on a review, by the author, of 35 depositions of 
owners, managers, doctors, and technicians affiliated with attorney-funded mass 
screening companies.
41 The depositions are not of people who were randomly selected 
from all participants in the screenings companies. The deponents were not all asked the 
same questions. The interviews were not repeated over time. So, it is not possible to 
generalize from the practices described below to the practices of all screening companies 
across all points in time. Three important points should be made, however, relative to the 
utility of the anecdotes below. First, taken as a whole, the depositions created the 
impression, for the author, that deviations from standard medical practice were more the 
norm than the exception for the companies that were deposed. Second, the specific 
deviations cited are sufficiently prevalent, and in some cases sufficiently serious, to 
suggest that an investigation of the practices of these companies should be conducted by 
                                                 
38  See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: The Right Way and the Wrong Way, Mo. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2005.)  
39  See,  e.g., Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Medical Exam Program for Former 
Workers at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Frequently Asked Questions,  at 
http://www.jhsph.edu/LANLFW/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Johns Hopkins FAQs] 
(describing medical screening program for former LANL workers occupationally exposed to asbestos and 
other potentially hazardous substances).  
40 Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos & The Sleeping Constitution, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003); see also 
Brickman, supra note 8 at 65. 
41 The depositions are supplemented by testimony from In re Silica Prods, Daubert Hearing, supra note 15.  
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the proper medical authorities (this is discussed at greater length in section 5.) Finally, the 
medical audits described in the prior section beg the question: What occurs in these mass 
screening companies to produce the diagnostic results found by the Johns Hopkins 
scientists, the Johns-Manville auditors, and others? Although anecdotal, these depositions 
provide a partial answer.         
 
Recruitment and Intake Interviews of Potential Mass Tort Claimants 
Litigation screenings are often conducted in vans or trailers that have been 
outfitted with X-ray machines. These mobile x-ray units can travel to union halls, motels 
or even restaurant parking lots to perform screenings.
42 Financial incentives produce a 
screening environment in which large numbers of people are moved through the testing 
process in short periods of time.
43 Rather than being referred by their treating physicians, 
workers in targeted industries are solicited for litigation-driven screenings through labor 
unions,
44 direct mail,
45 and advertising.
46 One company’s goal is to screen a minimum of 
50 people in one day,
47 and several companies reported performing 100 or more 
screenings a day.
48  
                                                 
42 See In re Silica Prods. Liab, Litig., supra note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 54-55 (testimony of plaintiffs’ 
diagnosing expert Dr. Harold Coulter) (testifying he was present for litigation screenings performed in a 
trailer in the parking lot of a Sizzler restaurant in Lewisville, Mississippi). 
43 “[F]rom a business standpoint of mine, you had to do large numbers.” In re Silica Prods., Daubert 
Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 281-82 (testimony of Heath Mason, owner of for-profit screening 
company N&M, Inc.). 
44 See Dep. of. Kenneth Werner, Oct. 3, 2000, at 199.  
45 In some cases, direct marketing companies are hired to blanket communities with direct mail solicitations 
with such solicitations as “Find out if you have Million Dollar Lungs.” Pamela Sherrid, Looking for Some 
Million Dollar Lungs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 17, 2001, at 36, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
U.S. News & World Rep. File.  
46 Newspaper or television advertisements typically give an 800 number to call to arrange for a free 
screening. See In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra n. 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 366-67 (testimony of 
Heath Mason) (describing television advertising in Mississippi and Alabama).  
47 See Dep. of Charles Foster, Aug. 6, 2002, at 141, in Morehouse v. N. Am. Refractories Co. (Ala. Cir. Ct. 
2002) (testimony of founder of Respiratory Testing Services, Inc.); see also Dep. of Gregory A. Nayden, 
M.D., Mar. 28, 2002, at 89, in Bentley v. Crane Co., Civ. Action No. 92-7655 (Miss. Cir. Ct. 2002) 
(testifying he saw 50 to 65 workers a day for asbestos screening, spending about ten minutes on each 
person for both the physical exam and the medical history).   
48 See Dep. of Glenn Pitts, Dec. 4, 1995, at 49, 147, 197, in Adams v. Metro. Ins. Co., No. 433-992 (La. 
Dist. Ct. 1995) (testimony from witness who ran Pulmonary Advisory Services, Inc. indicating doctors saw 
67 workers a day, performing a five-to-ten minute on-site physical exam); Dep. of K. Werner, supra n 41, 
at 145; In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., supra  note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 97 (testimony of plaintiffs’ 
diagnosing expert Dr. Harold Coulter) (physical exam of worker at screening program “probably tops 15 
minutes”).   
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When workers appear at the screening site they usually are required to sign a 
retainer agreement with the law firm sponsoring the testing. The retainer fee can be 
anywhere from 33 to 40 percent of the recovery.
49 (According to RAND claimants’ total 
legal expenses, including lawyers’ fees and other expenses averaged 39 % of gross 
compensation in 1984, and that continues to be the average through 2002. RAND notes 
that “although plaintiff lawyers may have recognized savings from routinization of the 
litigation (e.g. the widespread use of administrative payment schedules)…none of those 
we interviewed suggested that any of these savings have been passed on to claimants.”
50)  
In any medical screening program, good intake procedures are important to assure 
that the physician has the appropriate information to accurately diagnose a health 
condition and its likely cause.
51 “[T]he recording of patient information such as 
medications, age, race, medical history and exposure history are crucial to prevent errors 
in interpretation.”
52 There is no standard intake protocol among litigation screening 
companies. Intake procedures seem to be erratic. In at least one for-profit screening 
company there were no education or training requirements for the employees who took 
worker histories.
53 The owner of another screening company testified that he had “never 
                                                 
49 See, e.g., Brickman, supra note 8, at 64 & n.91 (plaintiffs’ attorneys fees in asbestos litigation typically 
range from 33 to 40 percent, even when settling or filing mass claims in what is essentially an 
administrative process.); Shrader & Williamson, L.L.P. Attorney-Fee Contract and Power of Attorney, 1 
(Section V. provides for attorneys’ fees of 40 percent of any gross recovery).  
50  See Carroll et al. supra note 2 at 103. 
51 For example, an accurate diagnosis of an asbestos-related condition: 
requires assessment of a number of factors, including the review of chest X-rays, pulmonary function tests, 
latency, and the taking of a complete occupational, exposure, medical and smoking history. Because many 
symptoms and findings are not specific to asbestos-related disease, this approach is necessary to enable a 
physician to exclude other more probably causes for various findings. This then enables the physician to 
support a conclusion that the patient’s medical condition is the result of asbestos exposures. AM. BAR 
ASS’N COMM’N ON ASBESTOS LITIG., ABA REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RECOMMENDATION & 
RESOLUTION, 12 (2003) (reporting consensus on proper practices among all doctors interviewed by ABA 
Commission on Asbestos Litigation).  
52 Dep. of Dr. Jose E. Roman-Candelaria, at 38, in Koontz v. AC&S, Inc., Cause No. 49D02-9601-MI-
0001-668 (Ind. Super. Ct. 2002). In the Johns Hopkins’ screening program for former Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL) workers, for example, the intake interviewers are former LANL workers. See Johns 
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Medical Exam Program for Former Workers at Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, The Program Team, at http://www.jhsph.edu/LANLFW/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 
29, 2005). 
53 Dep. of C. Foster, supra note 47, at 168-80, 168-71 (testimony of owner of RTS, Inc., describing how 
work histories and a medical form are filled out by part-time personnel who who were “[m]ostly high 
school graduates” without any training”). When questioned about how the interviewer knew what to ask 
during intake, Charles Foster testified: “Listen, I can take a six-year-old kid and put them at the desk and 
say fill this out.”). Guy Foster, owner of American Medical Testing, testified simply that medical intake 
employees “must have good handwriting and good hearing.” Dep. of Am. Med. Testing, Inc., Guy Wayne  
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heard of” anyone being medically trained to take worker histories.
54 In some cases the 
intake was done by someone from the law firm paying for the screening.
55 
Some screening companies do not take workers’ medical histories, job histories 
and/or smoking histories.
56  All of these are relevant to a diagnosis of an asbestos or 
silica-related health condition, as well as a determination of what may have caused or 
contributed to that condition.
57 In at least one company, intake personnel have discretion 
over what questions to ask, but they do not need to put their names on the intake form, 
making follow up on the intake interview difficult to impossible. 
58 
                                                                                                                                                 
Foster, Designee, Dec. 12, 2001, at 261, in Bentley v. Crane Co., Civ. Action No. 11-0064 (Miss. Cir. Ct. 
2001). See also In re Silica Prods. Liab.Lit., MDL 1553, Admin.Order No. 29 (S.D. Tex. June 30, 2005), 
(Judge Jack found that “there is no evidence that anyone answering the phones, whether employed by a 
screening company or a law firm, had any medical training or had been instructed by any medical 
professional what questions would be appropriate in taking an occupation history.” at 68. She rejected the 
notion that this task was too routine to require the doctor’s involvement: “[E]xperts in the field of 
occupational medicine do not consider taking an occupational history to be beneath a physician.” at 123. 
After noting that a “thorough, physician-guided work/exposure history is the kind of history that experts in 
the field of occupational medicine insist upon when diagnosing silicosis” she stated that the plaintiffs’ 
experts “relied upon a history taken by lawyers and clerks with no medical training or supervision. The 
questions asked were not drafted by physicians, testifying or otherwise; indeed, the challenged physicians 
were not even aware of what questions were asked.” at 125 and 126).      
54 See In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 293 & 291-93 (testimony of 
Heath Mason) (“I’ve never heard of someone being medically trained to take exposure history.”). 
55 See id. at 284-85 (identifying several law firms that took their own exposure histories at silica litigation 
screenings and stating: “Basically we would show up with just our X-ray equipment and they [the law firm 
workers] would do a brief work history with them [the persons being screened] before they allowed them to 
get an X-ray. If they thought they had adequate exposure, then they would say, “Hey, we’ll take your X-
ray.”); Dep. of K. Werner., supra note 45, at 209. 
56 See Dep. of Charles Kemeny, M.D., May 14, 1997, In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litg., MDL No.875 (E. 
D. Pa.) at 277-280 and 321.   
57 See Dr. Harold Coulter, who diagnosed a relatively small number of plaintiffs in the silica litigation, 
testified as follows: [O]ne of the things that sometimes is missing when you’re not directly there with the 
patient is asking about the character of their complaints, you know. Exactly, where was it located? What 
exactly is going on? You’ve got to be very, very specific. The who, the what, the why, the when, the where, 
the how. Were they wearing a mask? Were they not wearing a mask? Exactly what were they doing? Was 
there some additional exposures that they may not have had, such as, I know patients that I’ve had the 
opportunity of interacting with and talking to have said to me, “Yes, I did some sandblasting” or “Yes, I 
did some welding,” or “I cut some sheetrock. But you know my big job, Doctor, is I pressure wash on the 
weekends.” “Well, what are you pressure washing?” “Oh, all of these old buildings. There’s a lot of good 
money to be made. Well, sometimes the stuff flies off on me.” “Well, how do you know?” “Well because I 
got a piece of rock once in my eye and I had to go to the emergency clinic for it.” So there’s more to this 
than meets the eye. The history has to be expansive but it also has to be guided, if you will, by what the 
patient tells you. 
In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 44, 68 (testimony of plaintiffs’ 
diagnosing expert Dr. Harold Coulter) (also testifying he believed he diagnosed 140 to 150 patients; 
defense counsel stated he estimated the number of diagnoses at between 250 and 300). 
58 See Dep. of G. Foster, supra note 50. at 241 (testifying that the only way to know, after the fact, who 
filled out the form is to “recognize the handwriting.”). 
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    Some screening companies require workers to sign a form verifying they had been 
exposed to the substance at issue.
59 Sometimes, the assumption is made that if the person 
worked around asbestos or silica at any time in a job, he worked around it the entire time 
he was in that job.
60 A doctor working for a screening company testified as follows:  
 
Q: But, under your definition the existence of a pipe, in a 
workplace, without more, is [“]asbestos exposure[”]? 
A: Yes.
61 
 
In the federal silica MDL litigation, some plaintiffs who claimed they were 
“exposed” to silica included a homemaker who performed light housework and errands, a 
butcher at Sunstar Foods, and a manager for Wal-Mart.
62 
 
X-rays and Their Interpretations 
Once the litigation screening intake process is completed, workers receive a chest 
x-ray. They are typically not examined by a doctor prior to the x-ray and no treating 
physician concludes that an x-ray is necessary or medically appropriate for an individual 
                                                 
59See In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 306-07 (testimony of Heath 
Mason) (“They would have to circle yes or no whether they were exposed to silica and they would have to 
initial it themselves. And then they would sign their name to the bottom verifying that the information they 
gave us is to the best of their knowledge that it’s true.”). 
60 See Dep. of G. Foster, supra n. 50, at 212. Heath Mason, the owner of N&M Inc., testified in court 
hearings for the silica litigation: 
THE WITNESS: We didn’t put exactly how long they were at each job title; we 
just put how long that they were at this work site. 
THE COURT:   Okay. But you don’t know what they were doing in these 
various times? 
THE WITNESS: No, ma’am. 
THE  COURT:    Okay. Or the time they were exactly exposed to silica 
during this work time? 
THE WITNESS: Right. 
In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 292-93 (testimony of Heath Mason). 
61 Dep. of G. Nayden, supra note 44, at 277-80, 321. 
62 See Fact Sheets, Tab 11, Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Diagnoses, and for Judgment, In re Silica Prods. 
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1553 (S.D. Tex. 2004).  
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person.
63 In most states, with few exceptions, a physician must issue a prescription for an 
x-ray or the company must obtain approval from a state’s department of health to 
administer x-rays without a physician’s order. To get around these regulatory 
requirements, mass screening companies often use “blanket prescriptions.”
64 In most 
cases, medical doctors do not supervise the x-ray procedure. Sometimes the x-rays are 
not performed properly. One chiropractor who took x-rays for a screening company 
testified that he had the men he x-rayed remove their shirts only about half the time and 
he had women position themselves at the x-ray machine.
65 These methods deviate from 
acceptable medical practice. 
States also have registration, quality control and inspection requirements for the 
x-ray equipment and mobile vans. Some companies do not maintain their equipment.
66 
One company was unaware of state calibration requirements,
67 and a number of mass 
screening companies have fallen short of meeting state requirements for the use of x-ray 
equipment.  
State health departments have sanctioned chiropractors (South Carolina) and a 
screening company (Ohio and Texas) for violations of laws that regulate the use of x-ray 
equipment, including but not limited to: failure to annually renew a radiation protection 
program; inadequate shielding devices; occupational exposure limits not documented; 
cassettes and screens not inspected, cleaned or replaced; frequency and QC tests not 
performed or documented; records not maintained; equipment not registered; quality 
assurance records not available; calibration records not maintained; written operating 
procedures nonexistent; and radiation areas not posted with “Caution—Radiation Area” 
signs.
68   
                                                 
63 See Dep. of C. Kemeny, supra note 53, at 256. 
64 See Dep. of Roman-Candelaria, supra note 49. 
65 See Dep. of Dr. David T. Netherland, D.C., Feb. 14, 2002, at 171-172, in Bentley v. Crane Co., Civ. 
Action No. 92-7655 (Miss. Cir. Ct. 2002).  
66 See supra note 64. See also Dep. of K. Werner, supra note 41, at 387. 
67 See id. at 262; Dep. of D. Netherland, supra note 62, at 70. 
68 See In re David Netherland, D.C., Consent Order RXCO-07-2001, State of South Carolina Department of 
Health and Environmental Control, March 2001. See also letter to James Corbitt, U.S. X-Ray, Inc., from J. 
Nick Baird, Director of Health, Ohio Department of Health, Re: Notice of Violations-Public Health and 
Safety Risk Notice, Notice of Right to Evidentiary Hearing, Nov. 1, 2001; See also Emergency Cease and 
Desist Order No. 01062CO In the Matter of U.S. X-Ray, Inc. Before the Texas Department of Health, Aug. 
21,2001. Extensive documentation is available from the Ohio, Texas, and South Carolina Departments of 
Health.   
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After the x-rays are taken they are given to a B-reader – a medical doctor certified 
by NIOSH to interpret x-rays in accordance with standards established by the 
International Labour Office (ILO).
69 The B-readers interpret the x-rays and fill out 
standard ILO forms documenting their findings.
70 Although ILO guidelines require that 
the B reader read the x-ray blind to information about the individuals other than the 
radiographs themselves, including information about the individual’s purported 
occupational exposure, this guideline appears to be disregarded. 
71The B-readings are 
often performed off-site and the physician performing the B-readings rarely meets, 
personally examines or communicates with the worker, There appears to be a consistent 
tendency for for-profit screening services to identify whatever disease is the subject of 
litigation.
72 As one B-reader testified:  
 
Q. Doctor . . . the lawyers tell you the work history is exposure 
history that's consistent with asbestosis, or they want you to 
look for asbestosis, is that what the lawyers tell you? 
A.  Yes.
 73 
*   *   * 
THE WITNESS: I'm making the reading according to what 
information I have. 
THE COURT:   From the lawyer. 
THE WITNESS: What's on the film, plus what I'm given. 
                                                 
69 See Robert Glenn, The NIOSH B Reader Program: Recalling Its True Purpose, 16:1 PRODS. LIAB. 1 
(ABA, Sec. of Litig., Comm. on Prods. Liab. Litig. 2005). 
70 See Brickman, supra note 8, at 47 (explaining the use of ILO standards and how questionable diagnoses 
of asbestosis and silicosis can be generated from x-rays). 
71  See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Lit., supra note 57 at 131(“In the settling of a mass screening and/or mass 
B-reading for litigation, the B-reader is acutely aware of the precise disease he is supposed to be finding on 
the x-rays. In these cases, the doctors repeatedly testified that they were told to look for silicosis, and the 
doctors did as they were told.).  
72 As one physician has explained, in asbestos litigation, “the chest x-rays are not read blindly, but always 
with the knowledge of some asbestos exposure and that the lawyer wants to file litigation on the worker’s 
behalf.” David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 11, 13 
(2003) (quoting Lawrence Martin, M.D.).  
73 See In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 18, 2005, at 55-56 (testimony of plaintiffs’ 
expert Dr. James W. Ballard).  
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THE COURT:   From the lawyer. 
THE WITNESS: Yes.
74 
 
Pulmonary Function Tests and Their Interpretations 
If the x-ray findings are “positive” for conditions consistent with asbestos- or 
silica-related disease, sometimes the worker then undergoes a pulmonary function test 
(PFT), and, sometimes, a physical exam.
75 PFTs are a variety of breathing tests that, 
“when properly administered, provide objective, quantifiable measures of lung function 
to determine whether an individual is impaired and, if so, to what degree.”
76  
As with chest x-rays, written guidelines for PFT procedures sometimes are not 
provided to technicians,
77 and the PFTs sometimes are not administered according to 
medical standards.
78 One screening enterprise, N&M, Inc. advertised to law firm clients 
that its PFTs were performed to meet standards set by NIOSH or the American Thoracic 
Society (ATS), but, according to the owner’s deposition testimony, “a lot” of the time the 
company fell short of those standards: 
 
Q:  And you would advertise to these law firms that your company 
was offering PFT tests that performed in NIOSH and ATF 
[ATS] standards, correct?  
A:  Right. . . . Now there’s a difference now. You can only -- to 
say everybody applied . . . ATF [ATS] standards is definitely 
                                                 
74 See id. at 57-58. 
75 See id., Feb. 17, 2005, at 283-84 (testimony of Heath Mason). The worker will undergo the PFT at the 
screening program if the chest x-rays are read on site; in most cases, because these B-reads are performed 
off-site, workers must return for additional testing. 
76 Brickman, supra  note 8, at 111 (also stating that PFTs are the “primary means of evaluating non-
malignant asbestos-related personal injury claims and are widely used by both plaintiffs and defendants to 
determine the settlement values of claims and as evidence in trials.”). 
77 Pitts, who ran Pulmonary Advisory Services, testified that the company had no documents relating to 
testing procedures or evaluation criteria. Dep. of G. Pitts, supra note 45 at 31. A physician for another 
company confirmed that the guidelines given x-ray or pulmonary function test technicians in asbestos 
litigation screenings “are verbal. I don’t provide them with anything written.” Dep. of Jay Segarra, M.D., 
Oct. 14, 2002, at 17-18, in Moorehouse v. N. Am. Refractories Co., No. CI-2002-00253(2) (D. Miss. 2002).  
78 See Dep. of William McNeese, taken on Apr. 22, 1996, Abernathy v. AC & S, Inc.-A-920,967-C (Tx. 
Dist Ct. 1996). 155; Dep. of William Spence, Aug. 27, 1996, at 135, in Abernathy v. AC&S, Inc., A-920, 
967-C (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1996); Dep. Of G. Foster, supra note 50, at 192;   
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not the case. A lot of people can’t match the ATF [ATS] 
standards. You’ll see a lot of people where we attempted to 
make ATF [ATS] standards, but due to the client not 
following directions, they did not.  
Q:  Right. But they are performed to meet the ATF [ATS] 
standards?  
A:  Yeah. They’re performed to try to meet. That’s right.
79 
 
Indeed, it is possible to alter PFTs in the plaintiff’s favor in a number of ways.
80 
These include: failing to have the individual exhale for a long enough period of time; 
instructing the individual not to inhale forcibly, as required; failing to administer the 
correct number of reproducible tests; and failing to re-test when there is too great a 
variability between the two highest test results.
81 Failing to spend the proper amount of 
time on PFTs also may skew results.
82 Properly performed, a complete PFT battery can 
take approximately one to one and a half hours, depending on a number of variables.
83 
Charles Foster, who set up the PFT program for one screening company, Pulmonary 
Testing Services, before going into business for himself, testified that while he was at 
PTS, the average PFT took “three to eight minutes” to complete.
84  
    
                                                 
79 In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 370 (testimony of Heath Mason) 
(emphasis added). 
80 See Brickman, supra note 8, at 111-128 (describing standards for performance of PFTs and the potential 
for elevating impairment results by failing to achieve those standards). 
81 See id.; Dep. of J. Segarra, supra note 71, at 291-92 (doctor for Respiratory Testing Services who 
diagnosed workers for asbestos litigation acknowledged that one way testing results could be skewed was 
not to breathe in fully to start). 
82 See Brickman, supra note 8, at 126 (“PFTs administered at the rate of fifteen to twenty minutes each, let 
alone three to eight minutes each, are not intended to generate reliable medical evidence; rather they are 
intended to generate printouts of graphs to be added to a ‘litigant’s’ file so that it can be sold to a lawyer.”). 
83 See id. at 111 (also stating that PFTs are the “primary means of evaluating non-malignant asbestos-
related personal injury claims and are widely used by both plaintiffs and defendants to determine the 
settlement values of claims and as evidence in trials”). 
84 Dep. of Charles Foster, June 4, 1996, at 160, in In Re Consol. of Maples & Lomax, P.A., Asbestos Pers. 
Injury Cases, Flight 1 (Miss. Cir. Ct. 1996).    
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Diagnosis of Asbestos and Silica-Related Disease 
After the chest x-rays and pulmonary function tests are complete, a physician 
conducts a physical exam and issues a diagnostic report. In light of the lack of reliable 
information developed during intake and testing at the medical screenings, it is not 
surprising that a large number of diagnoses of asbestos- or silica-related disease are 
questionable. For example, a medically sound diagnosis of silicosis requires, at 
minimum, the following: x-ray findings consistent with silicosis; an exposure history that 
connotes a substantial risk of silicosis; the absence of any good reason to believe that the 
radiographic findings are the result of some other condition; and, for simple silicosis, an 
appropriate latency period, usually ten to fifteen years.
85  
Many times, medical experts’ written diagnoses in the federal silica MDL did not 
incorporate much, if any, exposure history.
86 Financial pressures require quick returns 
from the diagnosing doctors. In the federal silica MDL, plaintiffs’ diagnoses were 
produced at rates of more than 50 to more than 200 a day.
87 Further, some screening 
physicians have positive rates near 100%.
88  
Sometimes the diagnostic reports are dictated by the doctor and transcribed; other 
times non-medical personnel prepare a report straight from the ILO form. One plaintiffs’ 
expert physician in asbestos litigation reported that he did not dictate medical reports 
after examining patients but gave the file to his secretary and she wrote the report. He did 
not give her any instructions, written or otherwise. “She’s done so many of them she 
                                                 
85 See In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 42-44 (testimony of plaintiffs’ 
diagnosing expert Dr. Harold Coulter) (testifying that diagnosis of silica-related disease requires 
radiographs consistent with finding of silicosis, reasonable history of occupational or other history of silica 
exposure, including length of exposure, and information ruling out alternative causes); Transcript of 
Hearing, In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1553 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2004) (testimony of defense 
expert Dr. Gary Friedman); Guidelines for the Use of the ILO International Classification of Radiographs 
of Pneumoconioses, s 2 (Rev. Ed. 2000) “[n]o radiographic features are pathognomic of dust exposure” and 
“[s]ome radiographic features that are unrelated to inhaled dust may mimic those caused by dust); 
Transcript of Hearing, In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1553 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2004) (statement 
of plaintiffs’ counsel Scott Hooper to court) (“Judge, first off, the B-read is not a diagnosis.”). 
86 See Fact Sheets, Tab 11, Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Diagnoses, and for Judgment, In re Silica Prods. 
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1553, 4 (S.D. Tex. 2004). 
87 See id. at 2. Dr. George Martindale, who subsequently repudiated a number of his diagnosing expert 
reports, issued 3,617 diagnoses on 48 days in the first half of 2002, at the average rate of 75 diagnoses per 
day. He allegedly rendered many diagnoses without x-rays, id. at 5-6, as Dr. Allen Oaks supposedly did. 
See id. at 7.  
88 Dr. Greg Nayden testified that he had 100% diagnostic rate. See Dep. of G. Nayden, supra note 44.    
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knows.”
89 A plaintiffs’ expert physician in silica litigation testified that the secretary at 
his father’s (also a plaintiffs’ diagnosing expert) office wrote the reports using 
“boilerplate” language and referring to the ILO form, and used a stamp of his signature to 
“sign” the reports.
90 The doctor did not review the reports on individual patients before 
they were sent: 
 
THE COURT:   So you never read through the letters that were 
sent out with the stamped signatures? 
THE WITNESS: The individual letters, I did not. 
THE COURT:   Pardon? 
THE WITNESS: Not the individual letters. I had read through the 
boilerplate, you know, blank copies, if you will, 
to know what they said, and – 
* *    * 
THE COURT:   The  formal  diagnosing reports were written 
entirely by secretaries. 
MR. DAVIS:   Yes. Yes.
91 
THE COURT:   Is that right? 
MR. DAVIS:   That's correct. But there was nothing interpretive 
by any secretarial staff as to what was on the 
ILO.  
THE COURT:   Somebody has to read the marks and say what 
they mean. 
* *    * 
                                                 
89 Id at 299. 
90 See In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 18, 2005, at 156-57 (testimony of Dr. 
Andrew Harron). The use of boilerplate language appeared to be fairly common, as the substance of the 
litigation letters prepared by some physicians was essentially identical except for plaintiff-specific 
information. See Fact Sheets, Tab 11, Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Diagnoses, and for Judgment, In re Silica 
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1553, 9-12 (S.D. Tex. 2004).  
91  Billy Davis is counsel for certain plaintiffs in the federal silica MDL.  
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THE COURT:   Just listen to the question really carefully. This is 
not a difficult question. The first time the word 
silicosis shows up is in a letter that you never 
dictated, written by your secretary, that you 
never saw. Is that true or not true? 
THE WITNESS: I don't believe so. It was on the A sheet that the 
claimant had -- 
THE COURT:   I'm sorry. Does the word silicosis show up on the 
A sheet? 
THE WITNESS: There's are -- 
THE COURT:   Is there a word silicosis on the A sheet? 
THE WITNESS: There's the word silica. 
THE COURT:   Is the word silicosis on the A sheet? This is not 
difficult. 
THE WITNESS: I don't believe so. I don't recall. 
THE COURT:   Okay. 
THE WITNESS: I don't have the A sheet in front of me. 
THE  COURT:  So my point is the first time the word silicosis 
shows up was in a letter written by your secretary 
that you never saw. Is that correct?
92 
 
Quality control of the diagnosing reports is often performed by the doctors’ 
secretarial staff, or by the non-medical personnel at the screening companies themselves. 
 
                                                 
92 In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 18, 2005, at 154-58 (testimony of Dr. Andrew 
Harron).  
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Follow-Up With Workers  
Diagnostic reports and other screening records are usually sent only to the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, not to the workers or their personal physicians.
93 Dr. Werner of a 
screening company called Most Health Services (MHS) testified in the asbestos litigation 
that his company does not ask the identity of the worker’s primary care physician and 
that MHS has no follow-up system to assure that the law firm has informed workers of 
any positive test findings.
94 The owner of another screening company, American Medical 
Testing, testified that if a patient asks any questions after the exam they are told to call 
their lawyer: “Any further contact will be through the attorney.”
95 Screening company 
owners testified in the silica litigation that they believed
 that the law firms notified all 
screened workers of their results.
96 Some doctors have testified that they relayed their 
findings to workers at the screening,
97 but at least one doctor testified that he tells 
workers their diagnoses at screenings without telling them that it is only a preliminary 
diagnosis.
98 
  
The Role of the Law Firms 
Plaintiffs’ law firms pay for the screenings. Sometimes they select and contract 
directly with physicians who provide the technicians, perform the tests, interpret the 
reports, and render the diagnoses. The law firms that pay for the screenings determine the 
criteria for the screenings and who fits the criteria for the screenings,
99 and law firm 
personnel often are present during the mass screening programs.
100    
The law firms often determine what tests will be done: 
 
                                                 
93 See, e.g., Shrader & Williamson, L.L.P., Attorney-Fee Contract and Power of Attorney, 1 (Section V. 
states: “All experts employed shall report only to Attorney.”). 
94 See Dep. of K. Werner, supra note 41, at 193.  
95 Dep. of G. Foster, supra note 47, at A1. 
96 See Dep. of K. Werner, supra note 41, at 193 (stating his understanding, based on assurances from 
plaintiffs’ counsel, that “[t]he law firm, of course, contacts the people that are positive for asbestosis, 
positive diagnosis, and the ones that are negative.”).  
97 See In re Silica Prods. Liab, Litig., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, at 48 (testimony of plaintiffs’ expert 
Harold Coulter) (“[N] o one leaves without at least a tentative diagnosis.”). 
98 See id., Feb. 18, 2005, at 158-59 (testimony of Dr. Andrew Harron) (stating that he told all 50 workers he 
screened that they had silicosis before they left and did not explain it was a preliminary diagnosis). 
99 See id., Feb. 17, 2005, at 286 (testimony of Heath Mason). 
100 See id. at 284-85 (identifying several law firms that took workers’ exposure histories themselves prior to 
allowing an X-ray).  
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A:  [The] [o]nly tests provided are those ordered by the law firm. 
If the worker wanted to order, and pay for, additional tests he 
could not do so.
 101 
 
The law firms often determine how the tests will be done: 
Q: Correct me if I’m wrong, if . . . the law firm determines it wants 
a two-view X-Ray, then during the screening what is done is a 
two view X-Ray? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: In terms of your process, that is a law firm decision? 
A: Yes.
 102 
 
The lawyers determine what language is to be used in the expert  
physician reports: 
 
THE COURT:   [Some of the] doctors that have been testifying . . 
. use the terminology, “It's my opinion, to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty.” Those 
are not usually medical terminologies. I mean, 
when you send a diagnosis to another doctor, you 
say, “This x-ray and this history is consistent 
with a finding of silicosis.” Right? 
THE WITNESS: Usually, yes. 
                                                 
101 Dep. of K. Werner, supra n. 41, at 216.  
102 Dep. of C. Kemeny, supra note 53, at 139.   
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THE COURT:   Okay. Where did you come up with this language 
to use in these legal deals? Is this legal 
language? 
THE WITNESS: If I'm provided with the individual's exposure 
history, then I would say that it's a diagnosis with 
a reasonable degree of medical certainty that 
there is -- 
THE COURT:   I just asked where you came up with that kind of 
language? Did the lawyers tell you to use that? 
THE WITNESS: I think so, yes.
 103   
 
The law firms collect the test results and screening records. Generally, copies are 
not provided to the workers or their treating physicians.
104  
Several physicians have testified that they did not keep worker files or copies of 
the screening results that went to the law firms.
105 The medical screening companies 
rarely keep copies of the screening records and test results
106 or records regarding their 
procedures.
107 Nor do they keep copies of their billing records or contracts with the 
                                                 
103 In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 18, 2005, at 61 (plaintiffs’ expert Dr. James W. 
Ballard); see also id., Feb. 17, 2005, at 383-84, 387-89 (testimony of Heath Mason) (discussing identical 
language on a number of different physicians’ reports).  
104 Contrast this practice with medical screenings performed on potentially exposed workers at Los Alamos 
National Laboratories, where the screening program physicians explain the test results and health 
implications to the worker, tell the worker if there is a need for any treatment or follow up, and refer the 
worker to an appropriate medical provider as necessary. See Johns Hopkins FAQs, supra n. 49. Also, all 
test and examination results generated during the LANL screening program are to remain on file and copies 
of records are made available to the patient and his or her primary physician. See id.; cf. infra notes 49. 
105 See In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 98 (testimony of plaintiff’s 
expert Dr. Harold Coulter) (“I had a small note card that I would keep some information on, yes [during the 
screening]. … After we were complete, after we completed the reports or something like that, I tossed 
them. I didn’t hold onto them.”). 
106 See In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 296-99 (testimony of Heath 
Mason) (stating that medical records were all forwarded to lawyers in most cases; N&M kept records for 
clients of one law firm, Campbell Cherry, because the lawyers kept losing theirs). 
107 Dep. of C. Kemeny, supra note 53, at 263-266; Dep. of Helen Robinson, Case, Case No., Dec. 13, 2002, 
at 54; Dep. of G. Nayden, supra note 44, at 200; Dep. of K. Werner, supra note 41, at 224; Dep. of G. Pitts, 
supra note 45, at 192.   
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sponsoring law firms or the physicians and technicians they use.
108 Some companies do 
not even keep a copy of their books or corporate minutes.
109 The owner of American 
Medical Testing captured his company’s record-keeping as follows: 
 
Q: Are you telling me there are no written documents anywhere 
that indicate that your company is in the business of screening 
asbestos plaintiffs for litigation purposes? 
A: That’s correct. 
Q: But you know that’s what you do? 
A: That’s correct.
110 
 
Fees 
Most mass screening companies are paid on a per screening basis by the law 
firms.
111  A number of screening company witnesses (but not all) have testified to being 
paid a higher fee for those potential plaintiffs they find positive for asbestos- or silica-
related disease than for those potential plaintiffs that they find negative. The owner of 
N&M testified that his company charged one law firm $750 for a positive screening and 
nothing for a negative screening, generating up to 95 percent positive screenings a day: 
                                                 
108 See In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 296-99 (testimony of Heath 
Mason) (stating that medical records were all forwarded to lawyers in most cases; N&M kept records for 
clients of one law firm). 
109 One company owner testified that she did not keep books. At one point she did a cost breakdown but she 
“threw it away.” Dep. of Molly Netherland, Apr. 22, 1996, at 180, in In re Consol. of Maples & Lomax, 
P.A., Asbestos Pers. Injury Cases, Flight 1 (Miss. Cir. Ct. 1996). 
110 Dep. of G. Foster, supra note 50, at 230-31. Another screening company owner testified that he had no 
written contract with the law firms to pay for the screenings, but if a worker’s attorney “had told us that he 
would pay for the client, we would accept his word for it.” Dep. of G. Pitts, supra note 45, at 170. 
111 See Dep. of K. Werner, supra note 41, at 400; Dep. of G. Foster, supra note 47, at 219 & 229; Dep. of 
Ray A. Herron, Jan. 18, 2002, at 15, in In Re Asbestos Pers. Injury Litig.¸Civ. Action No. 01-C-9002 (W. 
Va. Cir. Ct. 2002); (testifying that he initially charged $1.99 for each x-ray he interpreted as a B-reader in 
asbestos litigation and that he reads at least 10,000 plus x-rays a year, plus additional x-rays sent to him by 
plaintiffs’ lawyers); Dep. of G. Pitts Depo., supra note 45, at 175 & 241; see In re Silica Prods., Daubert 
Hearing,  supra  note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 281 (testimony of Heath Mason); id. at 79 (testimony of 
plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Harold Coulter) (testifying he was paid $40 per person he saw at silica screenings, the 
same he charged private patients at his medical clinic). Although Medicare and most private health 
insurance plans cover diagnostic testing for asbestos disease, some of these mass screening companies 
report they have not been paid by these sources. Dep. of C. Foster, supra note 78, at 51; Dep. of G. Pitts, 
supra note 45, at 309.  
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I prided myself in not testing negative because -- I mean what you 
wanted to do was you had no reason to continue to X-ray a bunch 
of people who had no exposure. … In the [one plaintiffs’ law firm] 
situation you didn’t charge for a negative, so that was definitely 
another motivating factor in what you did as far as when you took 
their [clients’] exposure.
112 
 
One doctor who read a high volume of x-rays in a short period of time in the silica 
litigation testified that he charged more for positives ($70) than negatives ($35), because 
he felt it was unnecessary to write a narrative for the negative cases. (Not all deponents 
testified that they charged differential fees for positive and negative results.)  N&M 
charged another firm $35 for the chest x-ray and $300 for a physical and pulmonary 
testing – with gross receipts of about $3 million from the two firms in the silica MDL.
113 
The bottom line: The more positive screenings, the more money to be made.  
 
Management, Employee and Program Qualifications 
In bona fide medical screening programs, the technicians and administrative 
personnel as well as the physicians involved in the program are well-trained. In contrast, 
the owners and managers of the litigation screening companies typically do not have any 
medical education, and few have any training aside from that picked up on the job at 
other litigation screening companies.
114 Two screening company owners, who set up 
                                                 
112 In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 302-03 (testimony of Heath 
Mason).  In the asbestos litigation, one screening firm was paid $775 per patient if the report was positive 
and $175 if the report was negative. See Dep. of C. Foster, supra note 78, at 272. Another screening 
company, Pulmonary Testing Service, Inc., billed the law firms $400 if the tests were negative, but $700 if 
the tests were positive. See Dep. of Pulmonary Testing Servs., Inc., Jewel “Jerry” Pitts, Designee, Mar. 14, 
1996, at 128, 152-53, 284-394, in Adams v. Metro Life Ins. Co., No. 433-992 (La. Dist. Ct. 1996).   
113 See In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 302-03 (testimony of Heath 
Mason).  
114 Guy Foster, the owner of American Medical Testing (AMT) testified in 2001 that he is a high school 
graduate and has no medical training. See Dep. of G. Foster, supra note 50, at 55. Charles Foster, the owner 
of Respiratory Testing Services (RTS), left high school in the tenth grade and worked as a department store 
clerk, a pipefitter, and a tire store manager before entering the medical screening business. Dep. of C. 
Foster, supra note 78, at 113. He said his preparation for this business came from: “[j]ust being in the 
public, PR, no kind of schooling.” Id. After starting his own service, RTS, he took a several-day training 
course when he purchased pulmonary function testing equipment. Although he was awarded a certificate at  
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operations for different screening companies, acknowledged in deposition testimony that 
they had little understanding of the standards for administering PFTs.
115 One man 
testified he saw his company as “just an investment, really.”
116 The owner and operator of 
a third screening company actively managed a home repair business and a new home 
construction business at the same time as well.
117  
The employees and contractors who take the chest x-rays or perform the 
pulmonary function tests similarly may have no medical education, little training, and 
receive minimal, if any, medical supervision. For example, N&M’s PFT technicians were 
not certified respiratory therapists; they simply took three-day courses to get NIOSH 
certification to perform these tests.
118 
Several doctors involved in the asbestos or silica screening programs testified that 
they interpreted x-rays, issued diagnoses or conducted physical exams of workers in 
states where they were not licensed to practice medicine.
119 For example, Dr. Dominic 
Gaziano testified that he conducted evaluations in states such as Arkansas, Florida, 
Illinois, Ohio, Tennessee and Virginia without being licensed in those states to practice 
                                                                                                                                                 
that time, he said: “I couldn’t tell you two words that was [sic] said in there. … I didn’t really go to the 
classes. I was out on the beach.” Id. at 115. Heath Mason, the owner of N&M Testing Services (N&M) in 
Grand Bay, Alabama, which screened at least 6,500 plaintiffs in the federal silica MDL, left junior college 
after a year to work for his step-grandfather’s medical screening service. He testified that after he was fired 
from that company, he opened his own screening service at age 21. Neither he nor his partner, Molly 
Netherland, has any medical background, he said. See In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, 
Feb. 17, 2005, at 271-72 (testimony of Heath Mason). 
115 See Dep. of G. Pitts, supra note 45, at 296; Dep. of J. Pitts, supra note 107, at 125-26, 118-19. 
116 Owens-Illinois Motion for Case Management Order, MDL 875,Oct. 11, 2001, at 236 (quoting testimony 
of Glenn Pitts).  
117 Dep. of G. Foster, supra note 50, at 80.  
118 See In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 17, 2005, at 300-01 (testimony of Heath 
Mason). In contrast, PFT technicians for government preventative health screening programs are registered 
nurses or have advanced degrees, in additional to NIOSH certification. See Johns Hopkins Program Team 
FAQ¸ supra note 49.  
119 See, e.g., Dep. of G. Nayden, supra n. 44, at 57 (testifying in asbestos litigation that he conducted a 
number of physical examinations in Mississippi without being licensed to practice there); Dep. of Roman-
Candelaria,  supra note 49, and exhibits thereto (doctor is licensed only in Puerto Rico but he has 
acknowledged doing tests and diagnoses of workers in Mississippi, Indiana, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, 
Texas, and Georgia); Dep. of G. Foster, supra note 50, at (a doctor licensed only in Alabama has done 
physical exams in Georgia, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Florida.); Dep. of J. Segarra., supra note 71, at 251, 
254, 19 (testifying that he conducted screenings in Oregon, Washington, Indiana, Florida, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Georgia, Oklahoma, Missouri, and Illinois where he is not licensed); In re Silica Prods., Daubert 
Hearing, supra note 34, Feb. 18, 2005, at 37-38 (testimony of plaintiffs’ expert Dr. James W. Ballard) 
(stating that he traveled to Mississippi to perform screenings in asbestos litigation, although he was not 
licensed to practice medicine there, and that his work there involved performing B-reads but not meeting 
with workers or performing physical examinations).  
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medicine. The screening company Respiratory Testing Services paid him approximately 
$70,000 for 15 days of work.
120 Similarly, Dr. Jay Segarra evaluated over 600 people in 
Ohio on 12 days in 2000 when working for Respiratory Testing Services when he was 
not licensed to practice in Ohio.
121 In Washington, Dr. Segarra’s practice of medicine 
without license during screenings went before the Court. The Court ruled that: 
 
Dr. Segarra has the requisite skill, training, and experience to 
render expert diagnoses concerning lung disease. However, when 
he participated in union screenings of certain plaintiffs, he 
performed examinations, rendered diagnoses, and recommended 
treatment without being licensed in Washington, a criminal 
offense. He also relied for his diagnoses on radiology reports from 
unregistered and uncertified technicians or radiologists using 
unregistered and uncertified equipment. The court concludes it 
would contravene public policy to accept such evidence.
122    
 
4. The Financial Impact on Workers Employed by Bankrupt Companies 
Workers exposed to asbestos and injured as a result are not the only workers who 
have suffered harm. Many who were employees of asbestos defendants at the time they 
were driven into bankruptcy are hidden victims. Their plight is made particularly 
poignant by the role that claims based on unreliable medical evidence may have played in 
the bankruptcies.     
As was explained earlier, RAND estimates that the $74 billion dollars that has 
been spent on asbestos litigation through 2002 has produced at least 73 bankruptcies.
123      
 
                                                 
120 Id. At 194. 
121  See records produced at Deposition of Respiratory Testing Services, Inc., Representative: Charles 
Foster in Master Cons. Case Silica (and Mixed Dust)/Asbestos Docket; (Ct. of Common Please, Cuyahoga 
County,  Ohio).   
 
122  Order by the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, In re: Asbestos Cases of Brayton & Purcell, District Court 
of Salt Lake County, Utah (Salt Lake County Dist. Ct. Utah Jan. 28, 2005), pending reconsideration. 
123 Id.   
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When companies are sued, the costs they incur are usually passed on in the form 
of lower wages for employees or layoffs, reductions in assets for investors, and increased 
costs for consumers. Two research teams have examined the effects of asbestos litigation 
on the employees of the companies that were bankrupt as of 2002. There does not appear 
to be any comparable research on silica bankruptcies.  
One team of economists headed by Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz assessed the 
effects that 60 asbestos bankruptcies had on workers in those firms. Their study drew the 
following conclusions:  
 
•  Bankruptcies led to a loss of an estimated 52,000 to 60,000 jobs; 
•  Each displaced worker at the bankrupt firms faced a future loss, on average, of 
approximately $25,000 to $50,000 in wages over his or her career because of 
periods of unemployment and the likelihood of having to take a new job paying a 
lower salary; and 
•  The average worker at an asbestos-related bankrupt firm with a 401(k) plan 
suffered roughly $8,300 in pension losses, which represented, on average, a 
roughly 25 percent reduction in the value of the 401(k) account.
124 
 
A team of economists at National Economic Research Associates, in the same 
timeframe, added to the understanding of the downstream effects of asbestos 
bankruptcies. They made the following estimates of the losses experienced by workers 
laid off by asbestos-related bankruptcies: 
 
•  After 2-3 years 11% remained unemployed and 14% dropped out of the labor 
force. 
•  Wages for re-employed workers are between 3-17% lower at new jobs even 2-3 
years after the plant closure or layoff. 
•  Unemployment insurance typically accounts for less than 50% of the average 
wages for a displaced worker. 
                                                 
124 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Jonathan M. Orszag, Peter R. Orszag, The Impact of Asbestos Liabilities on Workers 
in Bankrupt Firms, Sebago Associates, December 2002.   
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•  Forty percent of displaced workers undertake retraining, with costs ranging from 
$2,000 to $3,000 per worker, and aggregate costs of $44-$76 million. 
•  Laid off workers face higher health insurance costs, averaging $300 per month. 
For the 72% of the estimated 52,000-60,000 laid off workers who participated in 
employer-sponsored health insurance before being laid off, this translated into an 
overall loss of $26-$30 million over the transition period of employment.
125  
 
5. The Impact on the Workers Tested: A Public Health Concern?
126 
Workers who were exposed to asbestos and subsequently became ill or died from 
an asbestos disease, have understandably evoked strong public sympathies. There also 
has been widespread public antipathy towards asbestos defendants in response to 
allegations of corporate cover-up over the dangers of asbestos, even though the 
allegations have been largely targeted at one company, Johns-Manville. 
127   
When Paul Brodeur’s book Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry on 
Trial was released in the mid 1980s it was reviewed in the Harvard Law Review by 
Harvard professor David Rosenberg. He had this to say: 
 
Conspiracy theories like Brodeur’s are in vogue today, especially 
where corporate activity is concerned. Conspiracy theorists 
usually claim that the victims of this or that unfortunate fate were 
                                                 
125 National Economic Research Associates, Secondary Impacts of Asbestos Liabilities on Workers, 
Taxpayers, and Local Communities, February 2003. 
126  The workers who have been screened by attorney-funded mass screening companies may have also 
been harmed financially. Unimpaired workers who were recruited by these companies and filed claims may 
not be able to file suit if later they become seriously ill. According to the recent RAND report: “Under 
traditional tort doctrine, only a single claim can be filed for any tort, even if that tort causes multiple 
injuries to a person. Therefore, in jurisdictions that follow this traditional rule, a worker who files a claim 
for pleural plaques or non-disabling asbestosis cannot file another claim if he or she develops more serious 
disease, such as cancer, in the future.” Many states have adopted a “two-disease” rule that allows asbestos 
plaintiffs who have filed claims for nonmalignant diseases to bring a second lawsuit if and when a 
malignancy is diagnosed. However, workers who cannot file suit in the states with a “two-disease” rule, or 
who develop disabling asbestos, as opposed to cancer, after receiving a small recovery in an unimpaired 
claim may be barred from recovering for the serious injury. In addition, workers with an asbestos exposure 
who are not injured now and have not file a claim, but who become sick in the future, may find that the 
funds have been depleted.  
127 Most defendants are “peripheral defendants,” companies that have had limited, sometimes highly 
attenuated, links to asbestos. RAND estimates that at least 8400 companies have been named as defendants 
through 2002, covering at least 75 of the 83 different industries listed at the 2-digit level in the SIC system. 
See supra note 2 at xxv.       
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duped by the wealthy and the powerful. The subjectivity of 
individual risk preferences, respect for people’s capacity to make 
basic choices, and common sense suggest that those advancing 
conspiracy claims should bear a fairly heavy burden of proof. 
128  
 
Rosenberg believes that Brodeur meets the burden.  Despite acknowledging the 
book’s flaws, most notably Brodeur’s tendency to become swept up in sympathy for the 
workers and his “unremitting hostility to capitalism,” Rosenberg believes the evidence 
paints an ugly and convincing picture. He is persuaded that “manufacturers had not only 
known of the risk to insulation workers since the 1930s; they had also planned and 
executed a cover-up — a policy of silence designed to avoid tort liability by concealing 
information about the risks of asbestos exposure.”
129  
Others, no doubt, disagree and dispute some or all of the evidence presented in the 
book. Yet it is against this backdrop, with which so many are so familiar, that asbestos 
litigation proceeds today, with the result that there has been a great reluctance in the 
courts, in the media, and in legal academe to scrutinize workers and their attorneys who 
are attempting to wrest money for them from the defendants. In the area of attorney-
funded screening activities, this lack of scrutiny has not only contributed to substantial 
economic damage to some defendants and at least some workers, it has also resulted in 
workers not benefiting from protections in the course of the delivery of health care testing 
services that others receive as a matter of course.   
It has taken more than two decades for a critical examination of these mass 
screening companies to develop. Ironically, this prior absence of scrutiny may in fact be 
harmful to the very people one would expect to be the beneficiaries. 
There is almost nothing in the press or legal or medical literature, other than scant 
anecdotes, that describes how workers are experiencing and reacting to these mass 
screenings. One recent publication contains an anecdote told to Andrew Schneider of the 
St. Louis Post Dispatch in 2002 that paints an unflattering picture of the attitudes with 
which two workers approached the screening process:   
                                                 
128 David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of Asbestos—Carnage, Cover-Up, and Litigation, 99 
Harv. L. Rev. 1693. 
129  Id.  
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“I saw the notice in the union news letter and said, ‘Why not?’” 
said an automotive worker from Ford. Sitting on the tailgate of his 
shiny, new Chevy pickup and lighting a fresh cigarette off the one 
he had just finished, he added: “It’s better than the lottery. If they 
find something, I get a few thousand dollars I didn’t have.  If they 
don’t find anything, I’ve just lost an afternoon.” 
Standing nearby, a Boeing worker 10 days from retirement 
volunteered, “The lawyers said I could get $10,000 or $12,000 if 
the shadow is big enough, and I know just the fishing boat I’d buy 
with that.”
130 
 
One gets a very different view of how workers have experienced these screenings 
from The National Tire Workers Litigation Project (NTWLP), one of the first attorney-
funded mass screening operations. NTWLP was sued by Raymark, an asbestos 
manufacturer, claiming they were defrauded. United States District Court Judge Patrick 
F. Kelly, who presided over that litigation, described the worker solicitation process: 
 
The defendants’ [NTWLP] deceptive and coercive solicitation 
process is evidenced by, among other things, the following: 
herding large numbers of tire workers and former tire workers into 
the meeting halls and rooms; showing them graphic slides 
depicting the effects of asbestos on human lungs; showing them 
local television news coverage concerning the NTWLP; providing 
the tire workers with frightening notices which informed the tire 
workers of a “serious health risk within our industry;” stating that 
some union members will need medical examinations; informing 
                                                 
130 American Insurance Association, Diagnosing for Dollars: Mass Screening and Asbestos Litigation, AIA 
Advocate, May 6, 2005.   
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them of the possibility of lawsuits; and offering to represent 
them.
131     
 
So, although some workers may have seen their testing process as a disingenuous 
effort to screen for asbestos-related disease. others may have seen it as a legitimate 
medical exercise. For those in the latter category the screenings in which they 
participated may have produced much more anguish than benefit. It was estimated earlier 
that 250,000 to 650,000 workers may have received false positive diagnoses of 
asbestosis. How many believed the diagnosis? Those who believed the diagnosis was 
accurate may have been quite troubled by the news; asbestosis is a progressive and 
disabling disease that can be fatal. At a recent judicial conference one judge commented:  
“I don’t know if any of you has ever known someone who died of asbestosis but I have 
and it isn’t pretty.” Many workers who have been exposed to asbestos have known and 
observed coworkers who suffered with and died from asbestos-related disease.
132  
Based on available information , the worker’s diagnosis is almost always 
communicated by the lawyers through a letter
133 with no provision made for proper 
communication of the diagnosis or counseling. This is in sharp contrast to accepted 
medical standards. An article published in the American Journal of Industrial Medicine 
cautioned that attorney-directed screenings are dangerous when they fail to provide 
adequate medical counseling or treatment for workers.
134 The article told about a 
maintenance worker at a vinyl chloride facility who participated in a lawyer-generated 
asbestos screening program and received a letter from the screening company informing 
him he had “markings consistent with asbestos related disease.” According to family 
members, the worker became upset and worried by this diagnosis, and preoccupied with 
                                                 
131 See Brickman supra note 8, at 99.  
132  See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig. supra note 57 at 152. (The court notes that those who received a false 
diagnosis of silicosis “can be expected to take their diagnosis seriously.” Since the person screened “never 
had the opportunity to ask the diagnosing doctor questions about the diagnosis and what it means…[A} 
misdiagnosis potentially imposes an emotional cost on the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s family that no court 
can calculate.”)    
133  The American College of Radiology has a “Practice Guideline for Communication” for diagnostic 
radiology, in which it asserts that communication is a critical component of the art and science of medicine. 
It can be found at:  
www.acr.org/s_acr/bind.asp?TrackID=&SID=1&DID=12196&CID=541&VID=2&DOC=File.PDF 
134 David Egilman & Susanna Ranking Bohme, Attorney-Directed Screenings Can be Hazardous, Am. J. 
IND. MED. 45:305 (2004).  
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the letter. His son recalled that he was “real worried about the fact that he would wind up 
like several of his friends, dying a slow death….he did not want to be an invalid and wind 
up on a breathing machine and feeders.” The worker subsequently shot and killed 
himself, after writing a suicide note on the back of the form that accompanied his 
notification letter from the mass screening company. 
Two psychiatrists who evaluated the case concluded that the diagnosis of 
asbestos-related disease and the fear he experienced of dying from the disease was a 
significant contributing factor in his suicide. Ironically and tragically, two independent B-
readers re-evaluated his x-rays and neither of them found “evidence of interstitial fibrosis 
or asbestosis.” The op-ed’s authors concluded that the man had many medical problems, 
including serious lung disease, most likely from smoking, but there was no evidence of 
asbestos disease from x-rays or pulmonary function tests.
135  
Another worker, who had his chest scanned in the parking lot of a Red Lion Inn, 
was told he tested positive for asbestos-related disease. His reaction: “It’s like living with 
a suicide bomb inside of you. You don’t know when it could go off.”
136  
According to the American Thoracic Society, people diagnosed with asbestos-
related disease should be counseled at the time of diagnosis and given certain 
information. Specifically, they should be informed of the “risk of progression of the 
disease, the risk of malignancy, and especially the interaction between smoking and 
asbestos exposure in enhancing the risk of lung cancer.”
137  
In addition to counseling relative to the diagnosis, some workers may require 
additional medical follow up. For example, patients with asbestosis may require 
immunization against pneumonococcal pneumonia and influenza.
138 People with silicosis 
are at high risk for developing tuberculosis (TB). Silica is believed to interfere with the 
body’s immune response to the bacteria that causes TB. Yearly skin tests to check for TB 
are recommended by the National Institute for Health, with anti-TB drugs recommended 
for those that show a positive skin test.
139 
                                                 
135 Id.  
136 Id. 
137 See American Thoracic Society, Diagnosis and Initial Management of Nonmalignant Diseases Related 
to Asbestos, American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine, Vol. 170, p.33.  
138  Id. at 34. 
139  See Medline Plus available at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000134.htm  
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When attorney-funded screening companies screen for asbestosis, they also 
unavoidably screen for lung cancer. A number of medical associations, including the 
National Cancer Institute
140 and the American College of Chest Physicians,
141 
recommend against using chest x-rays to screen for lung cancer. Randomized controlled 
trials have not demonstrated a reduction in lung cancer mortality resulting from screening 
with chest x-ray.   
There are two harms that can result from screening for lung cancer with chest 
radiography. First, a false-positive result can lead to an unnecessary invasive procedure, 
such as needle biopsy.
142 The second harm is overdiagnosis, the diagnosis of a small or 
slowly growing tumor that would not have become clinically significant had it not been 
detected by screening.
143   
Another troubling result of the tests administered by the attorney-funded 
screening companies relates to the likelihood that the tests themselves have increased the 
workers’ risk of cancer. In June of this year the National Academy of Sciences released a 
report on the increased cancer risk from medical x-rays. The report concluded that a 
preponderance of scientific evidence shows that even low dose radiation, such as that 
found in medical x-rays, poses a health risk. The study revealed that the risk of cancer 
“proceeds in a linear fashion at lower doses without a threshold and that the smallest dose 
has the potential to cause a small increase in risk [of cancer] to humans.”
144  Last year the 
federal government added x-rays to its list of “known carcinogens,” noting that 
“epidemiological studies of radiation exposure provide a consistent body of evidence for 
the carcinogenicity of x-radiation and gamma radiation in humans.”
145 According to a 
recent article in The Lancet, a highly respected medical journal, diagnostic x-rays are the 
                                                 
140  See  National Cancer Institute, Screening for Lung Cancer, 8/20/2003 available at 
www.bcbswny.com/kbase/nci/cdr0000062832.htm. 
141 See American College of Chest Physicians, Screening for Lung Cancer , CHEST, 2003: 123:83S-88S 
available at www.chestjournal.org/cgi/content/abstract/123/1. 
142 See National Cancer Institute supra note 138. 
143  Id. See also Sharon Begley, Early Cancer Detection Doesn’t Always Give Patient an Advantage, 
WALL ST. J, Aug. 26, 2005 at B1. (Quoting Dr. Barnett Kramer of the National Cancer Institute on the 
subject of the problem of overdiagnosis for screenings in general : “Overdiagnosis of cancer as a result of 
screening is the rule rather than the exception.)  
144 National Research Council, BEIR VII: Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, 
The National Academies, June 2005.  
145 National Toxicology Program, X-Radiation and Gamma Radiation, Report on Carcinogens, Eleventh 
Edition, 2004.  
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largest man-made source of radiation exposure to the general population, contributing 
about 14% of the total annual exposure worldwide from all sources. The report estimates 
that 5,695 radiation-induced cancers occur in the U.S. each year.
146 These recent reports 
raise particular concerns in those instances where mass screening companies have not 
properly maintained and submitted for inspection the x-ray equipment they use. Further, 
the reports by several screening companies and doctors that they neither forward the x-
rays to workers’ personal physicians, nor retain them on file, suggests the likelihood that 
workers could be subject to repeat x-ray examination by their own doctors. 
A failure to retain medical records when those records might be of some value to 
the patient is just one of several practices that appear to deviate from the American 
Medical Association’s Policy Statements, which constitute part of the AMA’s code of 
ethics.
147 Several other policy statements have possible bearing on the activities of 
attorney-funded mass screening companies: physicians should not charge contingency 
fees,
148 physicians should be above the influence of laypersons,
149 and physicians who 
have only a limited patient-physician relationship still have the duties of remaining 
objective, disclosing conflicts of interest, and properly informing and counseling patients 
regarding diagnoses.
150 Of course, the code requires that physicians never place their own 
financial interests above the well being of patients
151 and that they never permit financial 
incentives to compromise their clinical objectivity.
152 The physicians practicing with 
                                                 
146 Amy Berrington de Gonzalez and Sarah Darby, Risk of Cancer from Diagnostic X-Rays: Estimate for 
the UK and 14 Other Countries, THE LANCET, VOL. 363, at 345 and 349. 
147 AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Opinion E-7.05 Retention of Medical Records, June 1994. Physicians 
have an obligation to retain records which may reasonably be of value to a patient. Medical considerations 
are the primary basis for deciding how long to retain records….In deciding whether to keep certain parts of 
the record, an appropriate criterion is whether a physician would want the information if he or she were 
seeing the patient for the first time. (#1). 
148 Id. Opinion E-6.01, Contingent Physician Fees, Issued prior to April 1977, updated June 1994…a 
physician’s fee for medical services should be based on the value of the service provided by the physician 
to the patient and not on the uncertain outcome of a contingency that does not in any way relate to the value 
of the medical service.   
149 Id. Opinion E-8.05 Contractual Relationships, issued prior to April 199777, updated June 1994 and June 
1996. “…physicians should not be subjected to lay interference in professional medical matters and their 
primary responsibility should be to the patients they serve.” 
150 Id. Opinion E-10.03, Patient Physician Relationship in Context of Work-“Related and Independent 
Medical Examinations, issued December 1999, adopted June 1999.  
151 Id. Opinion E-8.03, Conflicts of Interest: Guidelines, issued July 1986, updated June 1994.  
152 Id. Opinion E-8.054, Financial Incentives and the Practice of Medicine, issued July 1986, adopted 
December 1997, updated June 2002.   
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attorney-funded mass screening operations should be sensitive to and in compliance with 
the provisions of this code.     
Finally, it should be mentioned that the harms from attorney-funded mass 
screenings extend beyond asbestos and silica workers to plaintiffs in fen-phen litigation. 
In late 2002 the judge presiding over the fen-phen trust became concerned that something 
was “seriously amiss” based on an unexpectedly high volume of claims against the diet 
drug trust, and ordered an audit of all claims for payment. By March 2004 the auditors 
had reviewed 4,500 claims and disqualified almost two-thirds of them. Further 
investigation revealed that lawyers were holding mass echocardiograph sessions in law 
offices and hotel rooms, using mobile echocardiograph machines and teams of traveling 
sonographers, and engaging in what the judge called “a mass production operation that 
would have been the envy of Henry Ford.” In the words of one physician-auditor: “We 
found serious, repeated, and verifiable alterations of systems controls to consistently 
exaggerate [the seriousness of disease.]” In one instance a patient whose condition was 
overstated ended up having unnecessary heart valve replacement surgery. Fifty other 
patients who had received diagnoses of mitral heart damage had actually suffered 
moderate or severe aortic valve damage, which had gone undiagnosed. 
153   
 
6. Policy Options and Recommendations 
There are numerous interventions under existing laws and rules that might have a 
positive influence on some of the abuses mentioned in this paper: sanctioning of 
unethical activities by lawyers through state bar associations, sanctioning of unethical or 
unlawful activities of physicians by medical boards, or sanctioning by state health 
departments of testing companies that fail to comply with state laws.    These corrections 
all rely on the capability and the will of existing institutions to enforce the rules. The 
abuses mentioned in this paper have a long history. It seems unlikely that change will 
occur if it must come from these groups under existing laws and rules. 
Attorney-funded mass screenings operate as they do because there are such strong 
financial incentives behind the high volume, assembly line business model approach to 
attracting plaintiffs and generating the medical evidence needed to file suit. The 
                                                 
153 Alison Frankel, Still Ticking, The American Lawyer, March 2005.  
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interventions most likely to succeed are those directed squarely at these financial 
incentives; e.g., those that target the point at which suits filed with inadequate medical 
evidence are permitted to go forward. This can be done most effectively by judges who 
are willing to be aggressive gatekeepers, helped along by legislated medical standards 
tailored to address the relatively unique issues raised by attorney-funded mass screenings. 
 
Judges as Gatekeepers 
All federal judges and state judges have procedural tools available to them to test 
the reliability of the medical evidence in cases that have been assigned to them.
154 Two 
good examples of the uses of these tools follow: 
In 1988, Judge Thomas Lambros in the Northern District of Ohio decided to test 
the viability of x-ray reports supporting asbestos claims on that district’s mass tort 
docket. He conducted an in camera inspection of 1700 B-reader reports and concluded: 
“…my concerns in giving priority to the medical questions have been vindicated because 
a review of these reports demonstrate that only 75 of the 1700 seamen have lung x-rays 
that show radiological changes related to an asbestos exposure.” Based on that review he 
divided the plaintiffs into four groups with the first group having no evidence of injury, 
the second group having some injury but no showing that it is asbestos-related, the third 
group having clear evidence of asbestos injury, and the last group having serious injury 
that could be asbestos related. He dealt with each of these groups in ways consistent with 
the nature and strength of the medical evidence they had presented.
155  
Judge Janis Graham Jack, who oversees the federal silica MDL in Texas, chose to 
require the production of strong evidence bearing on mass litigation screenings. She 
required plaintiffs to disclose the names of their diagnosing doctor or other health care 
provider, their diagnoses, dates of diagnoses or treatments, and what medical screenings 
or tests resulted in their diagnoses.
156  Such disclosures should highlight cases that stem 
only from screenings and which cases are backed up by the diagnoses of legitimate 
medical professionals. In the silica MDL, this information led to increasingly detailed 
                                                 
154  See, for example, David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. 
REV. 33 (2003).    
155   See  In re Asbestos Litig., MARDOC Order No. 32 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 1988) (Findings and 
Conclusions From In Camera Inspection of 1,666 X-Ray Reports)..  
156  In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL 1553, Admin. Order No. 6, at Ex. B (S.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2004).   
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investigation into the legitimacy of the plaintiffs’ claims.
157 As discussed supra, during 
this investigation, one diagnosing doctor expressly disclaimed his diagnoses of silica-
related disease that supported a number of plaintiffs’ claims, and other physicians 
testified that their office staff generated and signed their reports. Judge Jack is currently 
considering how to address the questionable claims generated through mass screening. 
Courts also could help assure that claims are legitimate by establishing an 
independent panel of expert physicians with recognized experience in the ILO 
classification system to determine the medical consensus as to what changes, if any, are 
actually reflected on an X-ray.
158 In scientific studies, certain protocols are generally 
followed to minimize bias and variability in the classification of individual radiographs 
made by physicians.
159 Expert panels established by the courts could institute similar 
criteria in the legal setting as used in scientific interpretations of chest films for 
pneumoconiotic changes. 
These criteria could include: (1) those interpreting the x-rays should not have any 
information about the individuals or potential occupational exposures; (2) identifying 
information on films should be masked and personal identifiers assigned; (3) 
classifications of films should be made in an independent manner without conferences 
between physicians; (4) to reach a final determination on an individual film, an odd 
number of readers should be employed with procedures put in place so as not to give 
undue weight to an unusually high or low interpretation; and (5) for certain findings, a 
consensus of agreement of the readers should be required (e.g., three out of five).
160 At 
least five readers should be used for these court-appointed panels.
161  The criteria for 
selecting those readers should include board certification in radiology or pulmonology, 
NIOSH B-reader certification, detailed knowledge of the ILO radiographic classification 
system and recognized experience in reviewing large numbers of films for the dust-
induced diseases.
162  
  
                                                 
157  See, e.g., In re Silica Prods., Daubert Hearings, supra note 34. 
158  See Glenn, supra note 65 at 5. 
159  See id. 
160 See id. 
161  See id.  
162  See id.   
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State Legislation that Facilitates the Active Gatekeeper Role  
Several states have enacted or are considering legislation that would significantly 
curtail abusive mass medical screenings while still allowing the appropriate development 
of medical evidence for claimants who have actual injuries.  
In 2004, the Ohio Legislature enacted landmark legislation establishing minimum 
medical requirements for asbestos
163 and silica litigation.
164 The Georgia Legislature 
followed suit in 2005.
165 These laws serve as good models for legislators in states 
experiencing problems with mass screenings. Here is how the new Ohio and Georgia 
laws work.  
Both the Ohio and Georgia laws require that at the very beginning of an asbestos 
or silica lawsuit, except for claims based on mesothelioma or cancer,
166 the plaintiff must 
make a prima facie showing of physical impairment resulting from a medical condition 
for which exposure to asbestos or silica was a substantial contributing factor.
167 This 
prima facie showing is an essential element of an asbestos or silica claim.
168 Further, for 
purposes of making this showing, the legislation bars the use of so-called “litigation 
doctors,” those who generate more than a minor amount of their professional income as 
expert witnesses in developing such evidence, or who are affiliated with a medical group 
that does.
169 
At the time of filing the complaint (Georgia) or within 30 days thereafter (Ohio), 
a plaintiff must submit a diagnosis and medical report by a licensed medical doctor who 
meets the qualifications set forth in the statute.
170 In Georgia, these reports are not 
                                                 
163 See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.91 et seq. (Anderson 2005). 
164 OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.84 et seq.(Anderson 2005). 
165 See G A. CODE ANN. §§ 51-14-1 to 51-14-10. On Apr. 27, 2005, the Texas Senate overwhelmingly 
passed SB 15, which would provide medical criteria for asbestos and silica claims and curb mass litigation 
screening practices, among other provisions. As of this writing, the bill was headed toward the Texas 
House of Representatives and quick action was expected. See Texas Civil Justice League News Release, 
(Apr. 27, 2005), available at http://www.texasbestos.com/news.php. 
166 In Ohio, no prima-facie showing is required for an asbestos mesothelioma claim, see OHIO REV. CODE § 
2307.92(E), or a claim based upon a malignant condition. See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.85(B), 2307.86(B), 
2307.92(B) A smoker who brings a claim based upon lung cancer, however, must make a prima facie 
showing. See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.85(C), 2307.86(C), 2307.92(C).  
167 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-3; OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.85(B), 2307.86(B), 2307.92(B). 
168 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-3; OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.85(B), 2307.86(B), 2307.92(B). 
169 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-2(17); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.84(I), 2307.91(Z). 
170  See  GA.  CODE  ANN. § 51-14-5(b)(1), 51-14-6; at OHIO  REV.  CODE §§ 2307.85(B), 2307.86(B), 
2307.87(A), 2307.92(B), 2307.93(A).  
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admissible at trial unless the parties agree otherwise.
171 In Ohio, the court’s findings and 
decision as to whether these documents constitute a prima facie showing of impairment 
are not admissible at trial.
172 If plaintiffs fail to file these materials, or fail to file materials 
that comply with the standards set forth in the legislation, their complaints must be 
dismissed without prejudice.
173 The plaintiffs may seek to reinstate their cases when they 
can make the required showing.
174  
The laws set forth the contents and requirements for the medical reports and other 
materials supporting the effort to make a prima facie showing. For example, for an 
asbestos claim, there must be a detailed narrative medical report and diagnosis of the 
asbestos-related physical impairment, accompanied by copies of the B-reading, 
pulmonary function tests, other documents required to show compliance with equipment, 
quality, interpretation and reporting standards in the legislation.
175  All reports and other 
evidence used to establish prima facie evidence of physical impairment must meet 
objective medical criteria related to exposure to asbestos.
176 This evidence must not be 
obtained through testing or examinations that violate any applicable law, regulation, 
licensing requirement, or medical code of practice.
177  
                                                 
171 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-7(c) 
172 See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.85(F)(3), 2307.86(F)(3), 2307.92(G)(3). 
173 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-5(b)(5); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.87(C), 2307.93(C). 
174 See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.87(C), 2307.93(C); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-5(b)(5) (stating that the court 
should dismiss claims without prejudice that do not establish prima facie evidence of physical impairment). 
175 See G A. CODE ANN. § 51-14-5(b)(1), 15-14-2(15); OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.92(B). In Georgia, for 
claims of asbestos-related cancer or mesothelioma, a board-certified pathologist must provide a medical 
report showing the diagnosis as a primary cancer or pleural or peritoneal mesothelioma and certify “to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty that exposure to asbestos was a substantial contributing factor to the 
diagnosed cancer and that it was not more probably the result of causes other than the asbestos exposure.” 
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-2(15)(A). For claims of nonmalignant asbestos-related disease, a board-certified 
internist, pulmonologist, or pathologist must provide a detailed medical report and diagnosis that the 
exposed person has a nonmalignant asbestos-related disease. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-2(15)(B). This 
report also must verify compliance with the intake requirements for the person’s occupational and exposure 
history and medical and smoking history; provide details of these histories and verify that at least 15 years 
have passed since the person’s first exposure to asbestos and the time of diagnosis. See id. at § 51-14-
2(15)(B)(i), (ii). The report also must verify that the exposed person meets specific medical criteria set 
forth in the legislation. See id. at § 51-14-2(15)(B)(iii), 51-14-2(15)(B)(iv). Finally, the report must verify 
that the doctor signing the detailed narrative medical report and diagnosis has concluded that exposure to 
asbestos was a substantial contributing factor to the exposed person’s medical condition and physical 
impairment and that the medical condition was not more probably the result of other causes revealed by the 
exposed person’s employment and medical histories. See id. at § 51-14-2(15)(B)(v). The requirements for 
the prima facie evidence to support silica claims are similarly rigorous. See id. at § 51-14-2(16).  
176 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-2(15); OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.92(F).  
177 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-2(15); OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.91(Z)(3)(a).  
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The Ohio and Georgia laws bar the use of materials generated by so-called 
litigation doctors to fulfill the prima facie evidence requirement.
178 The Ohio statute 
specifically states that the doctor who provides the diagnosis and medical report must 
have a doctor-patient relationship with the claimant.
179 The legislation in both states 
prevents doctors from basing their findings on tests, reports and other information from 
doctors who spend more than a minor amount of their professional practice time 
providing consulting or expert services for actual or potential civil actions, and whose 
medical group, clinic, professional corporation or other affiliated group earns more than a 
minor amount of its revenues from providing such services.
180 Both also exclude such 
information that is provided by chiropractors, podiatrists and others who are not medical 
doctors.
181 
Provisions in the legislation also de facto bar the use of lawyer-funded screening 
results.
182 In Georgia, reports, tests and other documents submitted for the prima facie 
evidence requirement are to be accepted only from medical doctors who are or were paid 
for the treatment of the exposed person by that person, or by that person’s health 
maintenance organization, or other medical provider.
183 Also, in both Ohio and Georgia, 
the doctors cannot require that the exposed person (or anyone with a claim based on the 
exposed person’s asbestos or silica exposure) retain legal services as a condition of 
diagnosing, examining, testing, screening or treating the exposed person.
184  
The physicians must be licensed to practice medicine and be currently board-
certified as an internist, pulmonologist or pathologist.
185 Moreover, the internist or 
                                                 
178 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-2(17); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.84(I), 2307.91(Z). 
179 See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.84(I)(2), 2307.91(Z)(2). 
180 The Ohio legislation provides that the doctor providing the diagnosis and medical report for the prima 
facie showing cannot spend more than 25 percent of his professional practice time in consulting or serving 
as an expert witness in actual or potential litigation. See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.84(I)(4), 2307.91(Z)(4). 
It also provides that the doctor’s medical group, professional corporation, clinic, or other affiliated group 
cannot obtain more than 20 percent of its revenues from providing such services. See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 
2307.84(I)(4), 2307.91(Z)(4). The Georgia legislation sets those figures at 10 percent of the doctor’s 
practice time, and 20 percent of the revenues of the doctor’s medical group or other affiliated group. See 
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-2(17)(A). 
181 See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.84(I)(1), 2307.91(Z)(1); see GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-14-2(15), (16). 
182 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-2(17); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.84(I), 2307.91(Z). 
183 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-2(17)(B). 
184 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-2(17)(C); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.84(I)(3)(c), 2307.91(Z)(3)(c). 
185  To be a “diagnosing physician” for purposes of completing the prima facie evidence report, the 
physician must be an internist currently certified by the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM), or a 
pulmonologist currently certified by the ABIM in the subspecialty of pulmonary medicine, or a pathologist  
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pulmonologist must be either treating (or have treated) the exposed person or have had a 
doctor-patient relationship with the exposed person.
186 The legislation sets out 
requirements for the “intake” portion of the tests.
187 First, information must be gathered 
from the exposed person by either the diagnosing doctor or a medical professional 
employed by and under the doctor’s direct supervision and control.
188 This provision 
would bar the practices in litigation screenings of having law firm employees or 
undereducated workers from the screening companies performing intake. 
Second, the information taken must include a detailed occupational history and 
the person most knowledgeable about the exposures at issue in the action.
189 The history 
must include all of the exposed person’s principal employments and exposures to 
airborne contaminants that can cause pulmonary impairment, including, but not limited to 
asbestos, silica and other disease-causing dusts.
190 The history also must include the 
nature, duration and level of any such exposure.
191  
This provision would help prevent “double-dipping” by asbestos-silica plaintiffs, 
as complete information about the person’s occupational exposure to both substances 
would be available to the doctor rendering the diagnosis.
192 This provision also would 
prevent litigation screening companies and their doctors from assuming that if a person 
worked for a company where asbestos or silica was present somewhere, at some time, the 
person was exposed to the substance for their entire employment. This should 
                                                                                                                                                 
who holds primary certification in anatomic pathology or combined anatomic or clinical pathology from 
the American Board of Pathology.  
186 The pathologist must be engaged in professional practice that is principally in the field of pathology and 
involves regular evaluation of pathology materials obtained from surgical or post-mortem specimens. 
187 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-2(15)(B), 51-14-2(16)(C); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.85(B), 2307.86(B), 
2307.92(B). 
188 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-2(15)(B)(i), 51-14-2(16)(C)(i); Ohio Am. Sub. H.B. 292 § 1, codified at 
OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.85(B)(1), 2307.86(B)(1), 2307.92(B)(1).  
189 See  GA.  CODE  ANN. § 51-14-2(15)(B)(i)(I), 51-14-2(16)(C)(i); OHIO  REV.  CODE §§ 2307.85(B)(1), 
2307.86(B)(1), 2307.92(B)(1). 
190 See  GA.  CODE  ANN. § 51-14-2(15)(B)(i)(I), 51-14-2(16)(C)(i); OHIO  REV.  CODE §§ 2307.85(B)(1), 
2307.86(B)(1), 2307.92(B)(1).  
191 See  GA.  CODE  ANN. § 51-14-2(15)(B)(i)(I), 51-14-2(16)(C)(i); OHIO  REV.  CODE §§ 2307.85(B)(1), 
2307.86(B)(1), 2307.92(B)(1). 
192  See Jonathan D. Glater, Asbestos Claims Decline, but Questions Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at C1, 
available at 2005 WLNR 5343368 (stating with respect to the federal silica multidistrict litigation: “The 
details of the diagnoses underlying some silica claimants are striking. Some of the same doctors who 
diagnosed silicosis in claimants had previously found asbestosis – another disease, which doctors said was 
typically characterized by different scaring of a different part of the lungs in the people they examined.”).  
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significantly reduce questionable claims by workers who spent little time, if any, close 
enough to asbestos or silica to constitute dangerous legitimate exposures.  
The information taken also must include a detailed medical and smoking history 
that includes a thorough review of the exposed person’s past and present medical 
problems and their most likely cause.
193 This provision helps assure that information 
relevant to alternative causes of the plaintiff’s alleged asbestos or silica-related health 
problems is available to the diagnosing physician.   
In addition, asbestos or silica claims filed in Georgia after the enacting date of the 
legislation must include a sworn information form containing specific information about 
such things as the location or duration of each exposure, the specific products and 
employers involved for each exposure, and the like.
194 Chest x-rays and pulmonary 
function tests are to be performed and interpreted in accordance with specified medical 
criteria.
195 
In Georgia, discovery is not to take place on the claim until the trial court enters 
an order determining that the plaintiff has established prima facie evidence of physical 
impairment, except discovery related to establishing or challenging the prima facie 
evidence of impairment, or by court order.
196 
It should be mentioned that at the time this paper is being written a trust fund bill 
is pending in the Congress, which if passed, might resolve the mass screening issue, 
depending on the provisions actually enacted. 
 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that the organized bar has addressed the issue 
of attorney-funded mass screenings through several positions it has adopted. The most 
recent and most relevant was introduced by the Tort and Insurance Practice Section and 
adopted by the American Bar Association in February of 2005.  This position statement 
recommends that the states develop standards for the operations of screening vans or 
                                                 
193  See  GA.  CODE  ANN. § 51-14-2(15)(B)(i)(II), 51-14-2(16)(C)(i); OHIO  REV.  CODE §§2307.85(B)(2), 
2307.86(B)(2), 2307.92(B)(2). 
194 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-6(a). 
195  See  GA.  CODE  ANN. § 51-14-2(15, § 51-14-2(16); OHIO  REV.  CODE §§ 2307.85(E), 2307.86(E), 
2307.92(F) .  
196 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-7.  
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other forms of mass screening for asbestos-related conditions, and that the standards 
should be enforced. 
197  
Organized medicine, on the other hand, has largely neither investigated nor 
developed position statements on attorney-funded mass screening programs. In fact, last 
year the AMA published a report on commercial screenings that addressed only coronary 
artery calcium screening, CT screening for lung cancer, CT scanning for colon cancer, 
and whole body scans. It did not mention  screenings conducted for litigation purposes.
198 
The AMA and the relevant specialty organizations need to address this issue. The 
depositions reviewed suggest that the conduct of the professionals and technicians 
involved in the screenings is clearly inconsistent with what might be called the penumbra 
of expectations derived from the statutory provisions, codes of ethics, and policy 
statements intended by the medical community to protect patients. We see lawyers 
instead of physicians determining what tests will be conducted, physicians using blanket 
prescriptions to authorize x-ray testing, inadequate communications with the workers 
before and after the tests (little or no intake history and no physician follow-up regarding 
test results), physicians who are not licensed where the tests are conducted, and apparent 
failure to maintain x-ray equipment to required standards. It is time for organized 
medicine to weigh in on this issue. Their views would help to motivate and inform judges 
and legislators.   
  
 
 
 
                                                 
197 American Bar Association, The position statement calls for compliance with:  FDA laws and regulations 
relative to the use of medical equipment and testing devices; local, state , and federal laws; and   
professional standards such as those promulgated by the AMA. It also recommends that the reading, 
evaluation and reporting of tests should be performed by a physician or other qualified medical 
professional; the physician or other qualified medical professional rendering the diagnosis should have 
personally examined the screened individual; a complete medical and exposure history should be taken and 
all relevant tests and information should be considered by the physician or medical professional rendering 
the diagnosis. Finally, all PFT tests should conform to standards; and diagnoses should should be made in 
accordance with the applicable standard of diagnostic care and communicated within a reasonable amount 
of time by the physician or other qualified medical professional rendering the diagnosis.   
198 See American Medical Association, Commercialized Medical Screening, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/13628.html 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper provides detailed descriptions of attorney-funded mass screenings for 
asbestosis and silicosis, citing numerous examples of how they can deviate from 
acceptable medical practice.  The principal point of the paper is that these deviations are 
likely to result in harm to the workers who are being screened.   
The harms to workers fall largely into three categories: 
First, hundreds of thousands of workers have been told they have asbestos- related 
or silica-related disease when in all likelihood they do not.  Audits conducted by 
independent, qualified medical teams have revealed an astonishingly high rate of false 
positive diagnoses coming from attorney-funded screenings. Since asbestosis and 
silicosis can advance to stages where there is considerable suffering, receiving such a 
diagnosis could cause alarm and anguish for workers and their families.  
Second, those workers who do have asbestosis and silicosis are likely to have 
been deprived of counseling and follow up care that the medical literature describes as 
critical for the management of these diseases. Attorney-funded mass screenings appear 
not to provide any counseling or follow up medical care. Nor do they assure that workers 
receive the proper medical care from some other source.  
Third, the chest x-rays that are integral to every screening expose the workers to a 
carcinogen, one that is of growing concern in the medical community.  A recent study by 
the National Academy of Sciences concludes that even low dose radiation such as that 
found in medical x-rays poses a health risk. According to an article in the prestigious 
medical journal The Lancet, diagnostic x-rays are the largest man-made source of 
radiation exposure to the general population. The report estimates that 5,695 radiation-
induced cancers occur in the U.S. each year.  In addition, chest x-rays can produce false 
positives for lung cancer, resulting in unnecessary and invasive procedures. 
Prior analyses of attorney-funded screenings have focused on the adverse impact 
they have had on defendants and the courts, perhaps implicitly assuming that workers 
only benefit from these activities.  A survey of workers who have participated in these 
screenings would be a useful supplement to this paper. It would be helpful to the courts, 
and to those who regulate the delivery of medical care, to get first-hand information on 
issues such as whether workers: thought this was a legitimate medical service, believed  
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the diagnosis, obtained any independent medical evaluation from their own physician, 
provided informed consent to the procedures, were told they might have lung cancer (and 
if so what testing or treatment followed), and believed the process delivered more 
benefits than harms.  
Attorney-funded mass screenings operate as they do because there are strong 
financial incentives behind the high volume, assembly line business model approach to 
attracting plaintiffs and generating the medical evidence needed to file a lawsuit. The 
most cost-effective reforms are likely to be those that are directed at the point of entry for 
the lawsuit. Judges should become active gatekeepers, assuring that only claims with 
proper medical evidence are allowed to go forward. One federal judge in Texas, presiding 
over a silica MDL, has provided a blueprint for effective gatekeeping of these claims. A 
few legislatures such as Georgia and Texas have acted to facilitate effective gatekeeping. 
Their statutes should be emulated. 
Last, organized medicine should break its long silence on this topic. The 
American Medical Association, the relevant specialty organizations, and state medical 
boards should investigate and act.  The unorthodox medical practices of attorney-funded 
mass screenings, and the size of the worker population that has been screened, make this 
a public health problem that requires attention. 